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ROMANTIC THEOPOLITICAL TESTAMENT 
– RICHARD J. NEUHAUS AND THE AMERICAN CITY OF MAN
Christianity is to life what Shakespeare is to literature: for it envisages the whole.
Malcolm Muggeridge
Richard J. Neuhaus was a fascinating phenomenon. A first-rate public intellectual, 
in the 1960s he was a civil rights Lutheran activist for the equality of black Ame-
ricans within the circle of Martin Luther King. He was a socially active priest-
intellectual. Neuhaus’s life was a life of an incessant burning passion, a Christian 
acutely aware that the times in which he lived were not ordinary times. He was at 
ease with the world and with people of all walks of life because he knew where 
the anchor was, a living embodiment of a truth found in the old maps of Christian 
antiquity, where Jerusalem was always at the center, the axis mundi – a blatant car-
tographical error, but a theological truth. At a time of ubiquitous disenchantment, 
Neuhaus was one of the greatest apologists of Christendom of today, a spectacular 
feast when Christendom was consigned by the majority of modern Western cogno-
scenti either to the ash heap of history or, at best, to a psychotherapeutic spirituality. 
His apology for Christendom, and the Catholic Church in that, stemmed from his 
understanding that Christianity, with all its sins, created and has been a defender of 
human freedom in the most fundamental, anthropological, but also political sense. 
A possible demise of Christianity would thus constitute in his judgment a menace 
to freedom even for those who battled it.
Neuhaus’s journey from Lutheranism to Catholicism in 1990 was long, akin 
to the one which Henry Newman once traveled, for a long time not realizing that in 
fact he was always there. Because, as he observed many years later, “I was a Pro-
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testant … albeit of Catholic and Catholic proclivities”.1 His conversion was also 
a call to faith in action. Nenhaus was an embodiment of the once common link 
between popular religion and high intellectual achievement, a combination of reli-
gious enthusiasm and a generous and transformative change for an improvement of 
this world. Cold intellectual sterility was not his style. He was living proof of some-
one who knew, as did the protagonists of Marilyn Robinson’s novel, that “nothing 
true can be said about God from a posture of defense”.2 This was a treasure in an 
age when the cognoscenti decided that reasoned faith is a charming oxymoron. Ha-
ving no patience with the secular intellectuals criticizing transcendental religions, 
who exhibited an ocean of ignorance and bad will, he reserved his most biting 
comments for the most radical of them, the new atheists, a curious brand of toxic 
pseudo-intellectuals who were late for the Enlightenment. Neuhaus dismissed them 
with the tart remark that he did not believe in the God in which they did not believe.
Post-1968 monistic liberalism and The Naked Public Square
In the 1980s, when he wrote his most famous book, The Naked Public Square, 
Neuhaus was considered a conservative. But his refusal to abandon traditional libe-
ralism, coupled with his conversion to Catholicism, gained him the label of a “neo-
conservative”, a notoriously elusive term, more one of abuse in recent decades than 
explaining anything.3 In terms of Catholic teaching, he was definitely a defender of 
the orthodoxy subverting the development within the Church dominant since the 
‘60s, which exploded in that decade and went by the name of liberal Catholic theolo-
gy, and which seemed gradually to have run its course.
For Neuhaus such liberal Catholicism was a dangerous path for the church’s 
theology. He realized that if the Church yielded theologically and morally, it would 
progressively become a province of a liberal state, since “where orthodoxy is optio-
nal, orthodoxy will sooner or later be proscribed.4 The problem was deeper though. 
Such liberal Catholicism, or Protestantism or Judaism, apart from professing just 
social gospel with such issues as the fight against poverty, war, or the environment, 
would soon turn the doctrinal, metaphysical component into some kind of spiritual 
comfort, psychology of a communion with the healing, all embracing God, so as 
to strengthen, not guide the inner self-esteem, merging with psychology turned to 
religion. Neuhaus knew that psychology was valuable only when it was based on 
sound metaphysics, but when it relied on a false philosophy, it became not only 
nonsense, but at the same time disastrous.
1 R. J. Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square Now: A Symposium on the 20-year anniversary of the publi-
cation of his influential The Naked Public Square, “First Things” 2004, November, p. 24.
2 Quoted in C. Miller, Simple Gifts, “Claremont Review of Books” 2009, Fall, p. 40.
3 He was termed a religious “neoconservative”, later dubbed during George W. Bush’s years a “theocon”, 
and was portrayed as such in the media, including such diverse networks as PBS, C-SPAN, and EWTN.
4 Quoted in: R. R. Reno, Religion, Culture, and Life, “First Things” 2009, April, p. 57.
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Apart from a youthful stint with radicalism, throughout his life Neuhaus 
remained a liberal democrat in politics, in the traditional sense of the word, when 
liberalism had not yet turned in the wake of the ‘60s into a monistic “religion”, 
excluding people not sharing its new anthropology and morality from public life. 
He had an Aristotelian and Augustinian view of politics. From Aristotle he took 
the conviction that people, irrespective of where they came from, should discuss 
and organize their life together for the common good. Against those who remo-
ved themselves from the civilizational circle of moral conversation he minced no 
words, branding the enlightened or less enlightened barbarians refusing a priori to 
be limited by what we know, wisdom we have received, and traditional notions 
of good and evil, right and wrong. For those who wanted to be part of a civilized 
circle of moral conversation, the essence of liberal democracy for him, he was al-
ways open to argument, provided they shared with him an understanding that truth 
existed and what was worthy in life did not stem from the whimsical wishes of the 
imperial Self. But he was also Augustinian, realizing that the first thing to remem-
ber was that politics was not the most important thing, and a fundamental division 
in politics between sacrum and profanum was a precondition of human freedom.
A radical critic sometimes of the most repugnant features of the new liberal 
civilization, Neuhaus showed no bitterness towards life and people of even the 
most opposite views. He knew that modernity was a station in human history into 
which God placed Himself. He realized the verity of the truth expressed by a pro-
tagonist from Robert Musil’s novel The Man without Qualities, that one could not 
be angry with one’s own times without doing damage to oneself. But as a public – 
and Catholic – intellectual, he was aware, after Augustine, of the provisionality of 
every mundane order, considering it his duty to “subject every mundane political or 
cultural order to the final judgment of the Kingdom of God”.5 His passion, and the 
memory of the glorious days of his social activity, prompted him sometimes to take 
risky intellectual endeavors and reckless political choices. This pertained especial-
ly to his flirting with liberal democracy as the best regime. In this respect he was 
a romantic Actonian. Part of that liberalism was of course the crucial presence of 
a transcendental religion, mainly Christianity, in the public square, in other words 
an absence of the “naked public square”, a profoundly illiberal situation, which was 
eventually, he thought, to elevate a state into the position of absolute, uncontested 
sovereign. The “liberation” of the ‘60s and radical secular modernity began to thre-
aten the moral order and free exercise of religion. The decision of the Supreme Co-
urt in 1947 in “Everson v. Board of Education” (330 U.S. 1), stating in effect that the 
First Amendment was to create a neutral public sphere, something which Neuhaus 
later called the “naked public square”, as a consequence led to a secular “sacraliza-
tion” of the idea of the separation of religion from society and culture.6 From now 
5 R. J. Neuhaus, Katolicy nie potrafią udowodnić swych racji [Catholics cannot prove they are right], 
“Europa”, 14, June 2006, p. 11.
6 Idem, The Public Square, “First Things” 2006, November, p. 78.
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on there was only a short step to conclude that the aim of the First Amendment was 
to protect the public space from religion in the name of neutrality and the rights of 
non-religious people. The whole post-Emerson adjudication thus revolved around 
the idea that religious people constituted a threat to the public order. On the basis of 
this adjudication the American elites began to create a climate which slowly pushed 
religious people into the margins of public life. The public rousing of religiously 
minded people in America since the 1970s, essentially a move of self-defense, was 
done in the name of freedom and in the name of the community.
Neuhaus responded to the new situation in 1984 with the book The Naked 
Public Square, understanding that the religious communities were fighting pre-
cisely for the separation of state and church, in a situation when the state began 
to dictate to religious communities their right social and doctrinal place. It was, 
argued Neuhaus, precisely the lack of such a separation which threatened religio-
us communities, and subjected them to public discrimination in the traditionally 
Christian America. This was no coincidence. The Supreme Court began slowly to 
accept a new anthropology of the imperial Self as a sole arbiter of individual right 
against rights of the community. Culture was taken over by the legislation of social 
justice propelled by rights derived from a subjective sense of grievance. The line 
between inalienable human rights and social rights was blurring, and the imperial 
Self was to be the sole arbiter of rights. Such a doctrine could not be an effective 
policy, but it was an effective ram to push religious language and people from pu-
blic discussion, to prepare quite a coherent doctrine of a new community defined 
by the new secular elites. 
With The Naked Public Square Neuhaus countered the official stance of the 
Supreme Court and the secular elites, pointing out that a point of separation in the 
antiestablishment clause of the First Amendment was not an enlightened rationa-
lism, but the reality of various competing religious groups. It was thus prudent to 
neutralize the state in matters of religion rather than run the risk of one of their 
opponents gaining control of the government. Thus “we must never tire of expla-
ining [that] the ‘no establishment’ provision of the First Amendment is entirely in 
the service of the ‘free exercise of religion’”.7 The point of the “antiestablishment” 
portion of the First Amendment was therefore not to defend a state and society 
against religion, but exactly the opposite, to defend religion against a state so as 
to provide security of religious denominations to function fully in a public sphere. 
Today, the situation is the same, except the realignment of alliances, since “the lines 
of suspicion and hostility are less and less between competing religious groups and 
more and more between publicly assertive religion in response to publicly assertive 
secularism”.8 
The Naked Public Square was not only the book which brought Neuhaus 
into public prominence, but it enabled him to organize a milieu of similar-thinking 
7 Ibidem.
8 Ibidem.
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people, beginning many public initiatives over the years, of which three seem to 
be the most consequential. The first was the founding of the Institute of Religion 
and Public Life in 1989. It began to publish the First Things magazine in 1990. The 
second, following Neuhaus’s conversion to Catholicism in 1990, was the manifesto 
“The Evangelicals and Catholics Together”, an ecumenical project that Neuhaus 
initiated with Charles Colson in 1992, to overcome the strains and tensions within 
American Christianity and to formulate a common strategy in the face of rampant 
and aggressive secularism. This turned out to be a crucial, even if rocky, alliance 
between the Evangelicals and the Catholics, or, to put it more precisely, between 
the conservative Evangelicals and the conservative Catholics, although the latter 
would probably prefer to be called orthodox.
The third initiative was a very controversial symposium at First Things in 
1996 entitled “The End of Democracy?”, in which the participants put forth the 
question whether an activist, rights-constructing role of the Supreme Court was still 
within the limits of a democratic, constitutional mandate, or whether it was already 
an usurpation of power.9 All three initiatives constituted a practical application of 
the ideas which Neuhaus promulgated in The Naked Public Square. But if the first 
two could be considered to be somehow intra-religious affairs, the third was con-
sidered by many as radical, calling for civil disobedience tactics and denying, inter 
alia, the legitimacy of the American political system.
With the first two initiatives the presence of religious, public-minded com-
munities slowly began to be accepted. The religious communities took their place 
in the public square, after a very long absence, as a civilizing cultural and social 
force in America. This acceptance was yet marred by accusations of this movement 
and its leaders of theocracy. Neuhaus and some others were soon dubbed “theocon-
servatives”.10 This constituted an ominous case of criminalization by association, 
when the very word “theocon” elicited images of a theocratic government like Iran. 
Neuhaus vehemently protested against such a term, while trying to elucidate a po-
sition regarding the liberalism he believed in.
Neuhaus believed that liberal democracy as he conceived it could at this 
point in history be the best available regime. He accepted liberal democracy not 
because it constituted the end of the human adventure in history, but conditionally, 
as for now, the best regime in which the properly formed moral aims of a human 
being can be achieved. For him sectarianism was for practical as well as theological 
reasons a false road for Christians. The Church was not a sect and could not escape 
the world, but only work out the best way in the existing one, using non possumus 
tactics, and the catacombs option, only in the conditions of grave idolatry which 
9 The editors of First Things formulated the problem as follows: “If the judiciary continues on its present 
course, if it does not restrain itself, and if there is no way to restrain it we are witnessing the end of democracy. See 
a transcript of that symposium, with a discussion which followed.” The End of Democracy? The Judicial Usurpa-
tion of Politics, ed. R. J. Neuhaus, M. Muncy, Dallas 1997.
10 The term was probably used for the first time by Jacob Heilbrunn in Neocon vs. Theocon, “New 
Republic”, December 30, 1996, p. 20–24.
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may corrupt a community. There was of course such a case which warranted for 
Neuhaus such a choice. This was abortion, which excluded the unborn from the 
common world of moral obligation, which is why Neuhaus battled it without he-
sitation. 
As he never tired of insisting in an Augustinian fashion, a Christian was 
in this world, but not entirely of this world.11 Yet there is a certain ambiguity in 
Neuhaus’s reasoning about liberal democracy. St. Augustine lived in the Roman 
Empire, but he had no illusions about its corruption, even if many elements of it, for 
instance Roman law, were a universal possession of humanity. The Christian con-
science, that is the true human conscience, was what counted for Augustine, and 
Rome was corrupting it. For Neuhaus that connection was much more nuanced, 
and he thought that there was a “pure” uncorrupted core of liberalism which could 
be either restored or searched for. That was not necessarily a bad pragmatic stance, 
but intellectually, and ultimately morally, it was risky. It is probable that there could 
never be the possibility of such a civil public square as Neuhaus longed for within 
the province of liberal ideology as a monistic ideology of the liberal Self. If so, then 
to be faithful to the City of God and St. Augustine’s distinction it was necessary 
to discern the very structural impossibilities of such an argument within liberal 
democracy as it has developed, and to create a new one, so as to engage oneself in 
a fundamentally countercultural, anti-systemic activity.12 To be honest, at the end 
of his life Neuhaus seemed to be more aware of such a dismal possibility. This was 
not only because the basics of his core religious beliefs were more and more incom-
patible with the tenets of existing liberal democracy, as they began to be codified 
now into a secular ideology of “human rights”, with protests against such dogmas 
utterly ineffectual. Intimations of this subtle reconsideration process may be visible 
in an elegiac form in his public testament, American Babylon. 
Catholics have of course always had a problem with the United States, and 
Neuhaus is not an exception here. The problem was not the transient one of poli-
tical and social discrimination, which to all practical purposes disappeared in the 
1950s. It was also not a problem of so-called “dual loyalty”. The problem was 
theologically deeper. From the point of view of the Catholic orthodoxy there has 
always been something suspicious about a nation which stated in its foundational 
document, The Declaration of Independence, as one of its basic values the “pur-
suit of happiness”, that is paradise on Earth, which was to be added, even if not 
predicted in the New Testament, into the promised paradise in Heaven. Of course 
11 R. J. Neuhaus, American Babylon, New York 2009, p. 11.
12 This was a core of a feud with the paleoconservatives, who told Neuhaus that he was not recognizing 
that the constitutional liberal regime in the United States he was dreaming about had gone at least half a cen-
tury ago, a fact that they claimed Neuhaus had not noticed. See The End of Democracy?..., p. 225–227. This of 
course implied that there was a possibility of sustaining a classical liberal constitutional “perpetuum mobile” of the 
American regime, a fascinating dream of the American conservatives, and a perennial baffling surprise not only of 
the cynical at large European intellectuals of all camps, let alone Catholics. This was also a feud with some Jewish 
neoconservative critics of the “First Things” symposium in 1997, who apparently seemed to tolerate Neuhaus’s 
Catholic truths if they were relativized, or pushed aside from the public square. Ibidem, p. 218.
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one could argue that this pursuit of happiness was part of such natural rights tied 
to the moral law prescribed by Creator. But the “pursuit of happiness” began to be 
understood, as one of the protagonists of The Great Gatsby remarked, as a license 
to treat America as a “great magic”, where everything was possible. From the point 
of view of Catholic doctrine this was a double heresy, theological and political. 
This heresy contributed to a decline in liberal Christianity in America, in both its 
Protestant and Catholic dimensions, in terms of metaphysical soundness.
There was also a strong expectation from non-Catholics that Catholicism wo-
uld evolve gradually into a kind of religious individualism. A similar process befell 
Protestantism. Catholics were expected to filter the truths of faith through a prism of 
individual conscience.
The problem was not that an active search for faith among Catholics or spre-
ading their faith was excluded from the public square; that was not feasible under 
the First Amendment doctrine of freedom of religion. What was expected on the 
side of the political and religious Protestant establishment was that the Catholic 
truth would be subordinated to the overreaching aim of American religiosity, that 
is a judgment of each individual conscience with slight attention given to theologi-
cal orthodoxy. This individual conscience directed by the all-American individual 
“pursuit of happiness” would cause a situation whereby each faith would be allot-
ted a niche for followers to nurture their faith, and in a similar way ethnic groups 
could nurture their individual identities. There was in such an approach a danger 
of trivialization, of turning religion into one of the Roman cults once supporting the 
glory of the empire, and now supporting the glory of America as a universal nation. 
Christianity and Catholicism, as any other religion, was to be turned into a kind of 
a social Gospel, a nice sublimation of a metaphysical longing into useful social cau-
ses, with charity and ubiquitous, all-tolerant vocabulary of forgiving love towards 
others, the world, and finally oneself, with a sprinkle of the “feel good” popular 
psychotherapy. The end station of such a development was a gradual decay of liberal 
Protestantism and also a decay of liberal Catholicism.13 The questions concerning 
the very essence of the reality of human existence began to morph into a kind of 
pantheistic spirituality aimed at “feeling good”. Catholicism, as happened earlier 
with liberal Protestantism, felt increasingly incapable of providing any clear criteria 
of moral judgment.
Protestantism could not sustain such pressure, and eventually split into li-
beral and fundamentalist wings. As for Catholicism, “opening windows” and “bu-
ilding bridges” to the world in the wake of the Second Vatican Council caused 
such a liberal Church to be headed by an increasingly liberal hierarchy, which split 
Catholicism and resulted overall in a civil war. That pertained to other Churches 
too, splitting them in the ‘70s into two warring camps, liberal and conservative. 
13 An excellent analysis of this process was made in two articles by J. Bottum: When the Swallows Come 
Back to Capistrano: Catholic Culture in America, “First Things”, October 2006 and The Death of Protestant 
America: A Political Theory of the Protestant Mainline, “First Things”, August–September 2008.
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This time the split was not between the traditional denominations of Catholics and 
Protestants, but within them, forming more or less visible alliances across denomi-
nations. Whatever the causes, consequences, and adequacy of responses, the fun-
damental issue went well beyond a matter of political, social, or even conventional 
doctrinal issues. The Churches had to confront a fundamental problem of the post-
1968 liberal order, the problem of the ontological status of truth and its source, 
which liberal civilization for the first time began to question, with Christianity gra-
dually being defined as irrelevant. An anthropology of the imperial Self was put in 
its place. What was at stake was the question how the Christian Churches, as well 
as any creedal faith, for instance Orthodox Judaism, should respond, and how they 
were going to function within such a liberal civilization tolerating them as “just” 
one of the versatile identity groups within the general framework of human rights.14
Such changes led to a dramatic questioning of traditional sources of human 
freedom and dignity, which the post-1968 monistic liberalism began to define anew. 
Its radical ontological and anthropological axiom began to be treated as a yardstick 
for legitimate behavior, in fact citizenship as such. It appeared that post-1968 li-
beralism had decided to wage an open war on the totality of human institutions, 
traditions, mores and wisdom itself, with its battle cry, taken from the New Left, 
of “emancipation” of everything from any conceivable “oppression”, which in fact 
meant the totality of the existing culture and religious life.15 Culture was defined 
as one seamless garb of post-modernist personal narratives, bound together by the 
ubiquitous prattle of “inclusion” of everything “excluded” in the world, without 
any judgment, hierarchy or condemnation for fear of “discrimination”, with solip-
sistic disintegration of common language and community life and a redefinition of 
human rights. Such a world view began to take over the Christian meaning of sin, 
substituting for it psycho-therapeutic dialogue and self-contentment. 
The biblical narrative suddenly began to be one of the possible narratives, 
or identities, to be chosen at will among all other available ones, including simply 
a personal narrative of any subjective will. Such a biblical narrative might be useful 
for teaching the good morality thus aiding the liberal narrative of emancipation and 
inclusion. That constituted the end of Christendom, since the Bible in Christian civi-
14 D. B. Hart defined this issue dramatically for the Christian churches as simply a rejection of the 
very essence of Christianity, a position considered by monistic liberalism as being a precondition of legitimate 
functioning in a liberal state. The issue, as he put it, was straightforward “If we turn from Christ [the truth – AB] 
today, we turn only towards the god of absolute will, and embrace him under either his most monstrous or his 
most vapid aspect.” D. B. Hart, Christ or Nothing, “First Things”, October 2003, p. 47–57.
15 See: H. Heclo, Christianity and American Democracy, Cambridge 2007; for an explanation for why the 
conflict immediately touched the essence of human freedom see D. B. Hart, Freedom and Decency, “First Things”, 
June–July 2004, esp. p. 41–41. Alisdair MacIntyre claimed in that context that however one frames it, “liberalism 
is [always] preempting the debate…so that [objections to it] appear to have become debates within liberalism … 
so called conservatism and so-called radicalism in contemporary debates are in general merely staking horses for 
liberalism: the contemporary debates within modern political systems are almost exclusively between conserva-
tive liberals, liberal liberals and radical liberals. There is little place in such political systems for the criticism of 
the system itself, that is, for putting liberalism in question”. A. McIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, as 
quoted [in:] E. T. Oakes, The Achievement of Alisdair MacIntyre, “First Things”, August–September 1996.
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lization, which created the modern society by providing its humanistic justification, 
was not just one of the narratives which constituted a part of some greater, cosmic 
narrative, to which other narratives belonged. It was the exclusive Great Narrative, 
which contained within itself all other narratives and made all others redundant.16 
The Church in that perspective was a depositary of anamnesis, a guardian of me-
mory, the essence of which was the Truth which elevated each human being to the 
image of God and made it untouchable by any other threatening human narrative, 
inexorably driven by a rationalized, utilitarian desire. The Church was not an or-
ganization with charitable, cultural or sociological theology, treated as exercises in 
perfection of one’s ego. 
Neuhaus was cursed and blessed to be part of such a drama. His response 
was as conscious as it was countercultural, doctrinally and politically. He understo-
od, while still a Lutheran minister, that such a cultural and anthropological redefi-
nition of reality posed a colossal challenge to traditional Christian orthodoxy. By 
implication it weakened the conflict with any other Christian Church, or currents 
within them, for whom the biblical narrative was an existential point of reference, 
while at the same time exacerbating such a conflict with these Churches, or the 
currents within them, which were more or less consciously accepting anti-biblical 
narrative. The same conflict, to be sure, was visible within liberalism, which began 
to split into all kinds of branches, with the so-called American liberal conservatives 
strongly clinging to the natural rights sources of American or human identity.
From a cultural and social point of view this was a new situation and made 
possible an opening on the part of all biblically faithful orthodox Churches to allay 
themselves, orthodox Catholics, fundamentalist Protestants, Orthodox Jews. Such 
an alliance was difficult to form. Protestant fundamentalism rebelled against liberal 
Protestantism, but escaped into its own world of faith, which from the point of view 
of the Catholic Church was emotional, not reasoned faith. Many fundamentalist 
churches reacted to the de facto creeping atheism of the Protestant Mainline Chur-
ches by escaping towards “unreasonable faith”. Many Catholics distancing themse-
lves from liberal Catholicism in the wake of the Second Vatican Council joined fun-
damentalists stressing born-again, evangelical aspects. But instead of “faith seeking 
understanding”, these Catholics subconsciously found themselves as allies of “faith 
escaping from understanding”. Such Catholics began to be looked upon as pawns in 
a war against “understanding destroying faith” preached by the Protestant left, that 
is liberal Protestantism. Catholicism began to split, as far as both the faithful and the 
priesthood were concerned. 
Neuhaus, still as a Lutheran minister, was aware of different ways of expres-
sing faith vis-à-vis the new liberal challenge, seeing the dialectical dimensions of 
the “unreasonable, escaping from understanding faith” of Protestant evangelicals 
with born-again, evangelical Catholics, “faith seeking understanding” of orthodox 
Catholics and Protestants. All of them reacted against the “understanding destroy-
16 D. B. Hart, Christ or Nothing…
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ing faith” which united the liberal wings of the Protestant and Catholic Churches, 
accepting the Social Gospel narrative within the larger language of progressive, 
monistic liberal narrative, and the latter’s stance towards religion, treated as a gene-
ric phenomenon, irrespective of what it was.17 The churches, which began to stress 
less a proper understanding of the Gospel, discipline and traditional liturgy, inc-
luding the Catholic Church, the most disciplined in its orthodoxy, began to crack. 
But the Catholic Church had such a problem on this scale for the first time, since 
what was at stake was not in fact a fight over the meaning of the Gospel, but one 
over the very relevance of the Church itself.18 A colossal schism comparable to the 
Reformation was looming large. It was during such turbulent times that Pope John 
Paul II took over the Church in 1978, and it was then that Neuhaus began to move 
towards orthodox Catholicism. Both eventually began to act in different realms, but 
they were very close theologically. 
Neuhaus by temperament was a social activist and intellectual fighter, ob-
sessed by questions over what the relationship between Christianity and the world, 
between the Church , and finally individual Christians and the world should be. 
He knew that Christianity was at a dramatic crossroads, and tried to answer his 
questions in response to the above developments, which amounted not only to 
a revolution inside Christianity, but to equally important evolutions inside of liberal, 
dominant Western doctrine. The first was threatening the integrity of the Christian 
creed; the second was threatening human freedom, and religious freedom at that. 
The Naked Public Square was a response to that dramatic predicament. Christianity, 
he said had a duty to engage culture energetically, and by that very fact to engage 
inescapably with politics as such. This was a more pressing task than ever, because 
Neuhaus already knew that the monistic pretensions of the post-1968 liberal politics, 
premised more and more on the idea that “the private is political” and thus needs to 
be “liberated” for the sake of individual rights, devour and dominate, in a totalitarian 
manner, more and more autonomous social bodies. This meant especially the bod-
ies which were traditionally outside of politics and no concern for politics, the very 
core of the Christian understanding of freedom based on the Augustinian distinction 
between sacrum and profanum. This constituted an emasculation of civil society 
and a subordination of the people to the logic of state power operated by the elites 
professing such an ideology, the problem Neuhaus and Peter Berger dealt with in the 
influential pamphlet “To Empower People”.19 This engagement of culture was not 
17 See for instance: R. J. Neuhaus’s essay published in: Civil Religion and Political Theology, ed. L. S. 
Rouner, Indiana 1986, p. 87–90, 209–211.
18 Within the Church there was also another current, less threatening at face value, because it officially 
did not subvert doctrine, simply transcending it. This was a drift towards “spirituality”, coming from East Asian 
religions, represented by such a prominent figure of Neuhaus’s generation, as the Trappist Thomas Merton, or the 
Jesuit Anthony de Mello S.J. See a comment on this in “First Things” 2006, Vol. 2, p. 53, 64–65.
19 P. L. Berger, R. J. Neuhaus, To Empower People: the Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy, 
Washington D.C., 1976. The concept of “private is political” is treated here figuratively. The slogan was invented 
by the radical feminist movement within the New Left “emancipation” ideology and inescapably dovetailed with 
the traditional liberal concern for individual rights. But once rights began to be grounded in an anthropology which 
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easy, but it had to be done. After John Courtney Murray, Neuhaus revived the tradi-
tion of “public theology”. He delineated his more theologically precise program in 
his important book The Catholic Moment, on his way to Catholicism and shortly 
before his conversion”.20
Neuhaus championed a form of Catholic wisdom that the modern world could 
not tolerate except in a condescending way, either by ostracism or with a shrug. But 
he had no doubt, following Murray, that Roman Catholicism was 
[...] the keeper of a truth that has everything to do with the right ordering of our lives toge-
ther in the “City of Man”. Murray represents a tradition of “public theology” that takes the world up 
on its claim to be, above all else, reasonable. In this view the mission of Roman Catholicism is not 
to be a refuge from the world nor a crusade against the world, but a wisdom for the world. Murray 
did not want to diminish the distinctiveness, even the scandalon, of the Church …. With Walker 
Percy [we may] come to the perfectly sensible conclusion that the modern world is manifestly mad. 
By the measures of such a world a sane person might very well seem to be mad. [But] it makes all 
the difference….whether one is a fool for Christ or just plain fool … Faith is for flaunting and the 
world must be challenged, but faith is not to be confused with a religious self-indulgence that ends 
up challenging not at all a world that has long since learned to tolerate almost anything …..There 
was, and there is, another Roman Catholicism that is determined to engage the world on its own 
terms. It is not enough … to flaunt and defy … [But this] scandalon of the Church [constitutes] the 
distinctiveness of the Church that, by contrast, highlights the distinctiveness of the civil society 
that we call the modern world … When the Church engages in the modern world, it must employ 
also the language of the head … the tradition of Thomas Aquinas [which] has … far from existed 
its possibilities in building an ecumenical understanding of the Church in the world. This is one of 
“the riddles of Roman Catholicism”, how it contains the tradition of both romance and reason in its 
relation to the world.21
This engagement in culture may be based on several paradigmatic models. 
If we assume for the sake of argument H. Richard Niebuhr’s potential models for 
Christian engagement in culture on which Neuhaus relyed, we have five such mo-
dels: the Church against the world, the Church of the world, the Church above the 
world, the Church as the transformer of the world and the Church and the world 
in paradox.22 Neuhaus’s clearly stated choice was the fifth model. Only paradox 
seemed to be capacious enough and capable of holding the first four tensions all at 
once. That is why 
made the imperial Self their source, with an auto-created individual morality, definition of oneself and the world, 
the concept of rights, and inescapably the concept of human rights at that, began to be defined in relation to it. This 
anthropology became a basic doctrine, for instance, of the US Supreme Court decision in “Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey” of 1992. As a consequence the list of rights began to be extended step by step, and because of autonomous 
institutions, like for instance families and churches, are treated as problematic institutions enslaving a “non-eman-
cipated” autonomous individual. This gave modern liberalism the ominous twist of having a totalitarian potential, 
a monistic ideology waging war on any as yet not liberated institution. See on that process: A. McIntyre, After Vir-
tue, Notre Dame IN 1981; also P. Manent, A World beyond Politics? A Defense of the Nation State, Princeton 2007.
20 R. J. Neuhaus, The Catholic Moment: “The Paradox of the Church in the Postmodern World, San 
Francisco 1987.
21 Ibidem, p. 7–8.
22 Ibidem, p. 16–24.
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[...] the Church is at points against the world, but always for the world by its participation in 
the transcendent, and it is ahead of the world by its anticipation of a future time, yet it is always of 
the world. And it is transformer of the world, not merely by providing spiritual energy for existing 
goals of change, but, most importantly, by reminding the world of its incompleteness, by preventing 
prideful or despairing acts of premature closure, by keeping the world open to the promised trans-
formation that is the destiny of Church and world alike. Authentic paradox is not like a riddle … 
that can be solved by greater understanding or the application of more careful reasoning. Authentic 
paradox, the paradox of the Church in the world, cannot be solved; it can only be superseded. It 
will be superseded, we have reason to believe, by the fulfillment of the promise, by the coming of 
the Kingdom.23
The Church thus has to resist both the temptation of the Great Inquisitor 
to close history by political means in the name of the Gospel, and that of the Gre-
at Escape from this world, that desire of “saving negativity toward the word”, as 
Neuhaus formulated it.24 The Church’s proposition here was to be premised upon 
a promise, and it was to be in tension with all such views of reality, as Neuhaus po-
ints out, premised simply upon the present world alone. The Church must also live 
in the present, but it is its promise which defines the ultimate truth about the present. 
The Church’s relationship to the world is 
[...] essentially paradoxical. It is a relationship of yes and no, now and not yet. The Church 
will endure until the End Time, but along the way it is ever being tested as to whether it has the 
courage to live in paradoxical fidelity. Nowhere is that testing so severe, nowhere is the outcome of 
that testing so ominous, as in the Roman Catholic Church. … the paradox cannot be resolved and 
must not be relaxed. It can only be superseded by the coming of the One who is both the consum-
mation and companion of our common pilgrimage.25
To fulfill that role the Church also has to define its moment properly, since 
it was a holy institution of the unholy people. To meet this double task, two inter-
twined missions – to the world and to America – had to be taken up. But they could 
only be accomplished, Neuhaus argued, by the Roman Catholic Church resisting 
the Protestant liberalization of faith, and also liberalization theology, which in many 
Christian circles coincided. The Church cannot “Protestantize”, since it would turn 
into one among myriad modern, social gospel Churches, turning to politics as 
a way of creating the kingdom on this earth. But this would amount to the greatest 
heresy of all, the immanentization of the eschaton. Neuhaus’s intellectual project 
was aimed at forming a conscious new coalition of Churches. Such a coalition 
could then engage culture with a proper understanding of its role in relation to the 
Christian promise of making the best of human beings, of calling them to heroism. 
23 Ibidem, p. 24.
24 Ibidem, p. 18. It was the latter’s course of Christian witnessing, as represented by a theologian Stanley 
Hauerwas, which became the basis of a friendly, if uncompromising argument between them, until the heated 
climax during the American engagement in Iraq in 2003 on the basis of the just war doctrine, which received 
conditional, and soon criticized, support from Neuhaus.
25 Ibidem, p. 288.
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Neuhaus was one of the theologians and ministers who saw in John Paul II 
someone for whom they had been waiting for a long time, a pontiff absolutely at ease 
in this world and outside of it, ecumenical to the core, but at the same uncompromi-
sing on the most fundamental principles of the faith, who was engaging this world 
in an active way, always knowing where the center of the cosmos was, and who 
brought from his Polish heritage its most cherished and heroic value of freedom. But 
both the pope and Neuhaus represented probably the last optimistic Christians in the 
phase of Catholic engagement in the world, at least in the Western world, when it 
was still thought that it was possible to engage and move Western culture. 
There was in the “Catholic Moment” a certain choice of a political project, 
if not overtly done, at least by implication. Neuhaus, like Murray before him, sided 
with the idea that at this point of time in human history Christianity could give quali-
fied support to help sustain the liberal project. Or one should better say its American 
version, rooted in the Enlightenment, which was definitely British and American, 
not the Jacobin French one. Such a liberal American Enlightenment, explicitly pro-
mulgated in the universal, natural law language of the Declaration of Independence 
of 1776, contained within itself an assumption that its operating political idea of 
freedom could not be sustained without the spiritual resources of Christianity. Neu-
haus was an heir here to all those American thinkers, politicians and preachers like 
Orestes Brownson, Abraham Lincoln, Richard Niebuhr, John Courtney Murray, or 
Martin Luther King. All of them claimed that it is impossible to understand and su-
stain the story of American freedom without the Christian story.26
“American Babylon” and the hopes of civilized liberal democracy 
With such a faith came Neuhaus’s conviction that liberal regimes on a course to 
aggressive secularism could somehow make a turnaround, that they could turn 
to Christianity, in the case of America an American foundational religion witho-
ut which the cause of freedom could not be sustained. Behind such an argument 
was a much more far-fetched project to avoid a clash of civilizations and make 
the Western type of liberal freedom possible to contemplate for the non-Western, 
for instance Islamic world. As Neuhaus argued on many an occasion, there was 
no chance that these people could accept a Western type of liberal regime, if the 
operating principle of that regime was decisively anti-religious, and which made 
this anti-religiosity a sine qua non condition of building such a regime. That was, 
Neuhaus warned, a recipe for disaster on a global scale, since in such a case secula-
rism, an aggressive ideology which refuses to give religion its rightful place in the 
public square and public deliberation, would turn out to be not a historical affliction 
of the Western liberal way, but its constitutive element. But it did not have to be so, 
26 See: A. Bryk, Covenant, the Fear of Failure and Revivals as the Contemporary Sources of American 
Identity [to be published].
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and it was not so, argued Neuhaus, observing and seeking with great magnanimity 
the possibility of democratization of Islamic countries from despotism. There was 
in that hope a wonderful disposition towards the Christian idea of freedom being 
tantamount to the liberal idea of freedom, the modern equivalent of Christian uni-
versality straight from St. Paul’s letters.27 
As far as his optimism was concerned life proved him wrong on many co-
unts. By the end of his life he had realized that it was increasingly belied by the co-
urse events had taken in the Western world, let alone America. Europe had long ago 
turned out to base its project of the European Union on the premise that Christia-
nity, its foundational religion, was not necessary to aid its freedom. It was also not 
fit to provide culturally the only European common identity. In fact the European 
Union was building its identity on a contemporary version of 18th-century French 
liberalism, with Christianity as the greatest enemy of freedom, in fact responsible 
for all the previous calamities in history.28
His greatest disappointment was yet to come with America, even if it was 
not overtly articulated. Neuhaus experienced an acute sense of puzzlement, when 
he observed the confusion of languages into which American religiosity was sli-
ding, in the face of the more and more aggressive secular liberalism. His belo-
ved Catholic Church had to endure the agony of the sex abuse scandals, instead 
of assertively taking the lead from the declining mainline Protestantism, let alone 
“civilizing” and infusing with theologically reasoned argument the public debate, 
including the public debate into which the fundamentalist and evangelical wings of 
Protestantism thrust themselves. 
General cultural trends have turned out to be more ominous, a situation long 
recognized in Europe and applauded there, but in America not only new, but looked 
upon with deep concern. True, the liberal wings of Christianity, whether Protestant 
or Catholic, have run their course and are drying out on the theological and cul-
tural roads erroneously taken. It is also true that the new orthodox, conservative 
movements have increasingly set the tone of religious as well as American public 
language since the 1970s and ‘80s. Nevertheless, Neuhaus’s optimism has not been 
corroborated by the hard realities of the American religiosity. Not only had the 
growth of liberal Christianity by the beginning of the 21st century reached its limits 
of expansion, but the American public has turned out to be less abiding religiously, 
which Neuhaus took for granted. And the picture of that religiosity is more and 
more blurred and confused. 
27 His Christian liberalism was ultimately very much a balancing act, which, some say, later in life led 
him to reckless political choices. Whatever the merits or demerits of such accusations, not all of them were coming 
from the circles of his avowed enemies. There is no doubt that his Christian liberalism was always “in danger of 
tipping over into an idolatrous Christianity that confuses America with the Church and vice versa, or into an idola-
trous liberalism that acknowledges no authority higher than Hobbes Leviathan or the imperial self”, in clear contra-
diction to his theoretical scheme of engagement on the part of the Christian explained in his books. R. Douthat, By 
the Waters…, “National Review”, April 20, 2009, p. 48.
28 See: A. Bryk, The United States, the European Union, Eastern Europe: Different Approaches and 
Responses to Modernity, “Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe” 2008, Vol. 1.
89ROMANTIC THEOPOLITICAL TESTAMENT...
This picture is not only complicated by the offensive of the militant secular 
atheists, a kind of déjà vu, a pseudo-intellectual phenomenon reminiscent of the 
European Enlightenment fight against religion two centuries ago. This is a marginal 
phenomenon, even if a noisy one. These atheists are philosophically anachronistic 
and primitive. Theologically they express the depth of wisdom of a village atheist. 
In fact, they celebrate unreason over reason, ignorance over knowledge, hatred 
over understanding.29 Although they may be hailed and marketed by the new se-
cular, aggressive liberal cognoscenti of the media or the universities, their efficacy 
is limited, as is the efficacy of any fad of a moment used for sinister purposes of 
persuasive, self-serving manipulation. But the fact that they proliferate signifies 
the easy gullibility of the public, no longer sure what is their religiosity, with more 
and more Americans, along with the rest of the Western world, sliding slowly into 
a kind of pantheistic spirituality, the ominous prospect which Tocqueville observed 
as a possible spiritual dead-end station of the democratic man.30 In the course of 
this process a kind of ersatz Christianity, a long term consequence of the liberal 
post-‘60s dissolution of Christian orthodoxy coupled with a spread of a therapeutic 
culture, has begun to proliferate, creating a phenomenon named “moralistic the-
rapeutic deism”.31 Neuhaus was at the end of his life aware of this process. He 
attempted to explain the American religious dynamic and American liberal-demo-
cratic predicament in his last book, with the grim title American Babylon: Notes of 
a Christian Exile. It may seem to be a collection of hastily assembled essays, but 
it is one which is nevertheless bound by a profound underlying narrative. In The 
Naked Public Square, Neuhaus decried the exclusion of religion, chiefly Christia-
nity, from public discussion and policy making. His argument was made less from 
a stance of a sectarian believer as from the point of view of a freedom-oriented 
man in a liberal democracy. He was convinced that once religion was driven from 
the public square a state would establish a virtual monopoly on public space and its 
basic meanings. By doing that, it would establish a pseudo-religion of its own, in 
fact imposing absolute sovereignty, with a corresponding diminution of human po-
tential stemming from rightly ordered freedom. American Babylon takes up these 
thoughts, but it is additionally a book about America, Neuhaus’s trust in her people 
and their energy. This is finally a book about passionate, romantic adventure, and at 
the same time his testament, a profound meditation on a closing life. 
29 See on this the study of one of the most profound modern religious thinkers D. B. Hart, Atheists Delu-
sions: The Christian Revolution and its Fashionable Enemies, Yale University Press 2009.
30 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Chicago 2000, p. 425–426.
31 The idea of a therapeutic culture was essentially predicated on the notion that it would be a substitute for 
Christianity. See A. R. Heintze, Jews and the American Soul: Human Nature in the Twentieth Century, Princeton 
2004, something which Neuhaus pointed out in his review of Heintze’s book in one of his Public Square reviews. 
On the psychotherapeutic culture see the classic study by P. Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith 
after Freud, Wilmington 2006; the term “moralistic therapeutic deism” was introduced by the sociologist Christian 
Smith.
90 ANDRZEJ BRYK
To the question whether the American freedom experiment was tied to Ju-
deo-Christianity, because the overwhelming majority of Americans were Chri-
stians, or because the American experiment in freedom required Judeo-Christianity 
to sustain it, Neuhaus responded tentatively, but without hesitation. The American 
freedom experiment required Judeo-Christian anthropology for its sustenance. It 
provided a fundamental prerequisite for it, a metaphysical, pre-political division of 
powers between sacrum and profanum. This division was rooted in the distinctive 
ontology of a personal God, who had made a covenant with his people and with 
each person individually. Yahweh put such an individual under his which was abso-
lute, because God could never be defined or touched, so his commands could never 
be destroyed or abolished. This covenant constituted the beginning of Western fre-
edom, because it delegitimized once and for all any tyranny which might ever be 
attempted. It was this covenant, claimed Neuhaus, which gave rise to the chain of 
thought, tied to the practical, institutional experience of courageous people, which 
gave rise to the American republic, a universal achievement, and by implication the 
Christian gift to humanity. 
American Babylon has a both polemical and devotional character, and it co-
vers a vast amount of contemporary as well as eternal questions, culminating in 
a moving meditation on the nature of Christian hope. It weaves through theology 
as well as political philosophy issues, merging many currents. But its main theme 
is Augustinian in character, trying to explain the 
[...] proper attitude that would-be inhabitants of the City of God should take toward the 
City of Man in which they find themselves in exile … Are we in Babylon? Are we in exile? ... [Yes 
because] Babylon is a symbol for a place or idea.32
Neuhaus is aware that to identify America with Babylon is all too easy, 
since many in the world use the language of anti-Americanism to show the utter 
confusion and moral conceit of Americans, combined at the same time with their 
allegedly irresponsible use of power. But to say that America is Babylon, claims 
Neuhaus, is not to compare it with other societies, but to compare it with that 
[...] radically new order sought by all who know love’s grief in refusing to settle for a com-
munity of less than truth and justice uncompromised. [For Christians], it is [always] exile from that 
new order.33
This is not, as many in history accused Christians, especially Catholics, 
a dual belonging to and betrayal of the earthly homeland. Neuhaus explains that he 
belonged to America, accepting fully God’s plan to know him through a mediation 
of American culture, a privilege which he cherished. Thus we accept our mundane 
existence within 
32 R. J. Neuhaus, American Babylon…, p. 48–49.
33 Ibidem, p. 2.
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[...] the scandal of particularity that is [our] place in a word far short of the best of all possi-
ble worlds. This world, for all its well-earned satisfactions, is worthy of our love and allegiance. It 
is self-flattering conceit to think that we deserve a better world. What’s wrong with this one begins 
with us. And yet we are dissatisfied. Our restless discontent takes the form not of complaint but of 
hope. There is a promise not yet fulfilled. One lives in discontented gratitude for the promise, which 
is to say one lives in hope.34
Neuhaus was aware that one has to find a way of being in a world that is not 
yet the world for which one hopes. For Christians this has always been an espe-
cially wrenching issue, since they are the people who are “in but not of the world” 
in a time which is “now” but “not yet”, the Old Testament, Jewish in origin, idea. 
Christians thus live “between the times”, engaging others in a language which is 
both rational and eschatological, building rational, mental bridges so a “final leap 
of faith” is not an absurdity, but a rational choice left after all alternatives have been 
exhausted. Thus, 
[...] all time is time toward home, time toward our true home in the New Jerusalem. And 
so there is a continuing tension between the “this-worldly” and the “otherworldly” dimensions of 
Christian existence … the word for this is prolepsis, an act in which a hoped-for future is already 
present. For Christians, the supreme act of prolepsis is the Eucharist Eschatology refers to the last 
things, the final things, the ultimate destination of the story of God’s dealings with the world of 
creation. In the Christian view, that destination, that eschaton, has already appeared within history 
in the resurrection of Jesus from the dead … The Christian claim is that God – the Absolute, Being 
Itself, the Source and End of all that is has invested himself in the human project. This happened 
with the Incarnation. The People of God is a pilgrim people … But at the end of the day, we say with 
Paul, “Now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know 
fully, even as I have been fully known”.35 
So Neuhaus’s is a Christian narrative which is, of course, also a narrative 
within the entire Jewish narrative of the Old Testament, reaching to the Books of 
Genesis and Exodus, with the promise of Moses’ Tablets. He is at the same time 
a Christian apologist in the best understanding of the word “apology”, a sense suc-
cinctly captured by the great Catholic apologist and writer Hilaire Belloc:
The Catholic Church is the exponent of Reality. In the twentieth century Catholics are the 
only organized body consistently appealing to reason. For if God is not, then all falsehoods, though 
each prove the rest false, are each true, and every evil is its own good, and there is confusion eve-
rywhere. But if God is, then the world can stand.36
Where is that Reality, and where is that opening to individual freedom? For 
Neuhaus this was an absolutely rational statement, since from it comes the Augu-
stinian framework of sacrum and profanum. This is the shortest definition of the 
Western idea of freedom, claimed Neuhaus, when power was limited not by any 
34 Ibidem, p. 3.
35 Ibidem, p. 13–15, 21–22.
36 Quoted from: The Essential Belloc: A Prophet for Our Times, ed. S. Bloch, Charlotte 2011.
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human institutional framework, but by a metaphysical perspective which killed 
once and for all any despotic pretensions of the powers that be. This was the basis 
upon which any regime was from now on defined as legitimate or illegitimate. It 
was legitimate only when a state was providing the conditions for the development 
of a properly shaped conscience. This Augustinian framework is grounded in the 
idea of God as a person, which of course comes from Judaism. It is this Judeo-
Christian narrative which has since antiquity become the freedom narrative of the 
West. Of course, writes Neuhaus, 
[...] the earthly city of Augustine’s time was the Roman Empire. The earthly city to which 
[I] attend is chiefly, but by no means only, America. Augustine’s City of God provides a conceptual 
framework. For Augustine, the biblical narrative provides the drama of which we are part. City of 
God weaves into that narrative Augustine’s penetrating insights into the possibilities and limits of 
the human condition [with] Augustinian sensibility. It is the sensibility of the pilgrim through time 
who resolutely resists the temptation to despair in the face of history’s disappointments and trage-
dies, and just as resolutely declines the delusion of having arrived at history’s end.37
It is within this Augustinian framework that Neuhaus deals with confused, 
always in tension, and interrelated problems of the modern American liberal-de-
mocratic experience. For Neuhaus the paramount issue is as always the dignity 
of human person as realized in freedom, of which the sine qua non element is 
a properly understood religious freedom. Here he is a warrior. But his confronta-
tion with adversaries is always with an open heart. His form is dialogical, and his 
major enemies are not people who have different views, but monistic ideologues, 
totalitarians of one idea, who want to exclude others from the civilizational circle 
of moral conversation, as he liked to say, barbarians who look with disdain at “tra-
ditional values”, refusing to be limited at all by what we know, good and evil, right 
and wrong. To wit by wisdom we have received, which is an instinctual point of 
orientation of the overwhelming number of the people.
American Babylon is in general a religious and cultural meditation and pole-
mic, touching on issues ranging from the relationship of Christianity with postmo-
dernity, the confused and tense relationship with monistic liberalism as a modern 
ideology of the secular state, through the question of a proper balance between 
political activity and eschatological expectation, to, finally, the relationship of Chri-
stianity to the American experiment. It also contains Neuhaus’s special, personal, 
beloved subjects, written with hope mixed with delicate disappointments, interrup-
ted by promising as well as false truces, of which the relationship of Christianity 
with the Jews, especially in America, occupies a paramount position. Neuhaus was 
a passionate man, but when it comes to Christian-Jewish relations his passion was 
at the same time tied to a romantic, in a theological sense, philosemitism, a stance 
which had, of course, many practical consequences as well.38 Hoping cannot be 
37 R. J. Neuhaus, American Babylon…, p. 23.
38 I owe the phrase “romantic philosemitism” to D. H. Hart, Con Man, “The New Criterion”, September 
2006, p. 127.
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helped, observes Neuhaus, but the Christian reason for hope is intimately and inse-
parably connected with the people of Israel. 
Neuhaus recognizes the dramatic dilemmas and challenges of Christian-Je-
wish inter-faith relations. They are often messy and acrimonious, fused with me-
mories of bitter scars from the past, and sometimes an arrogance and bad will on 
both sides as well. He does not hide all the shades of such a dialogue. Yet he is 
adamant in stressing that such misunderstandings, complications, differences of 
languages used should and might be overcome with a mutual feeling of friendship 
and magnanimity. Both sides should be vitally interested in keeping up a meta-
physical awareness which may come only from a properly understood freedom of 
religious experience.
This, argues Neuhaus, is the fundamental rock of human freedom, and at 
the same time it provides the surest basis of social and political security for all 
sides concerned. The main enemy of such freedom and security today is radical 
secularism. This radical secularism, rooted in an anthropology of the imperial Self, 
aims at the “naked public square” totally devoid of any transcendent dimension 
which is the only true guarantee of human dignity and the rights stemming from it. 
For Neuhaus, Jews and Christians should be aware of that danger. This monistic 
liberalism can push liberal democracy onto the slippery slope towards barbarism. 
If secular Jews do not recognize that such liberalism might be a danger to freedom 
as such, of which the authentic freedom of religion is a foundation stone, then they 
may fool themselves that such horrid experiences as happened before, including 
the Holocaust, can never be repeated.”39
Neuhaus refuses to subject the Christian-Jewish dialogue to the logic of li-
beral secular monism which would make the Christian-Jewish relationship a trite 
affair of looking at the Jewish-Christian drama not in a perspective of the eternal 
covenant offered to them by the God of Abraham, but through the lenses of recent 
calamities. If such a perspective is going to be obscured, Jews and Christians may 
easily slide into historical obsessions with past wrongs, mainly the ones which 
Christians committed towards Jews. In such a situation the true religion of the Jews 
and, by implication, the logic of Christian-Jewish dialogue, will be not the religion 
of the God of Abraham, but a “religion of the Holocaust”. This may constitute the 
highest form of idolatry, imposed on both sides by the liberal monistic narrative, 
and a posthumous victory of Hitler.
Friendship between a Jew and a Christian can be secured, thinks Neuhaus, 
[...] in our shared love for God of Israel; the historical forms we call Judaism and Christian-
ity will be transcended, but not superseded, by the fulfillment of eschatological promise. But along 
the way to that final fulfillment, there is no avoiding the fact that we are locked in argument. It is 
an argument by which – for both Jew and Christian – conscience is formed, witness in honed, and 
friendship deepened. This is our destiny, and this is our duty, as members of the one people of God 
39 R. J. Neuhaus, American Babylon…, p. 168–169, 163, 165.
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– a people of God for which there is no plural. The Church does not go [today] outside herself but
more deeply within herself to engage Jews and Judaism. Christians believe that that redemption that 
is surely yet to come has already appeared in the Redeemer [Jews] sense of heightened expectation 
of something new – as distinct from the confirmation of a completely foregone and foreknown con-
clusion – seems to me the appropriate mode of eschatological hope for Christians. Knowing that we 
do not yet know even as we are known, we know that there is more to be known. Dialogue between 
Jews and Christians should be marked by an element of curiosity, by shared exploration of what we 
do not know, and perhaps cannot know until the End of Time.40 
For Neuhaus, if a true, deep theological alliance might be formed, properly 
understood Christian-Jewish dialogue in the contemporary world is essential for 
a wise approach to politics and freedom as such. Both Jews and Christians are 
uniquely equipped to contribute to the human story of freedom by engaging in a se-
cular world with their understanding of the human journey on earth. It is especially 
important for them to relativize the claims of historical and political self-sustained, 
and self-justified argument, stemming from a materialistic concept of reality. They 
should contribute to a decent society, countering the pretensions of the secular, 
monistic mind, which has a tendency to turn religions, and Christianity and Juda-
ism as the religions of the transcendent God especially, into a castrated spirituality 
sustaining and enhancing, as in Rome, the glory of the naked state power. This is 
because Christians and Jews 
[...] bear witness together. These are truths without which our life in exile is, in the words 
of Thomas Hobbes, ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’. They are truths with which, in the 
vision of the prophet Jeremiah, the peace of our place of exile, in which we find our peace, can be 
approximately secured.41
If writing honestly about the relationships between Christians and Jews 
means writing about problems, the theological problems which Christianity faces 
in relations to modernity and postmodernity, the issue which occupied Neuhaus’s 
thought essentially one way or another throughout all his writings, they are sum-
med up in American Babylon. Neuhaus wrestles with the fundamental problem of 
how Christianity has to face the hegemonic pretensions of the Enlightenment. This 
Enlightenment, with its truncated concept of rationality, is in an existential sense 
capable of explaining nothing about the ultimate predicament of human existence. 
But in a political sense, despite the pretensions of monistic liberalism, which requ-
ires all other alternative explanations of reality to be reduced to an inconsequential 
hobby of a private pursuit, it is also flawed. This is an old theological problem 
which in contemporary Christianity can be symbolically defined as a contest of 
two visions. One is the vision of Karl Rahner, with his concept of “anthropological 
breakthrough” which considered Christianity to be an inescapable part of modern 
consciousness. Hence the demand to understand the world from within it. The other 
40 Ibidem, p. 180–181.
41 Ibidem, p. 182.
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was the perspective of Hans Urs von Balthasar, who, in the line of the great Pro-
testant theologian Karl Barth, considered the Christian’s role as a witness to the 
anamnesis. But this required defiance in face of the pretensions of the Enlighten-
ment and modernity.
Neuhaus rejects siding with the postmodernist anti-rational rebellion, altho-
ugh he recognizes the dramatic problem which the Christians face. Subjected to the 
constant pressure of rationality alone, and its political equivalent of the monistic 
liberalism of rights, without any legitimate public recognition of the wisdom of 
tradition or revelation, they feel more and more like paratroopers dropped into an 
enemy’s territory. The contemporary liberal culture, smug enough to think that li-
beralism can sustain the political and moral structure of rights without any recourse 
to tradition or revelation, seems to them not only arid, but outright dangerous. It is 
obvious that such liberalism lacks proper ontological and anthropological founda-
tions. For this very reason it is not only a spent intellectual force, circling around 
within the extremely narrow confines of taken-for-granted existential axioms and 
in the process itself subverting the very basis of rationality of which it claims to be 
a master. But at the same time, refusing to recognize that, and not allowing other 
traditions to flourish in the public square, or pressing them to become just a folk-
lore-type ornament, it is turning into a form of a monistic ideology with outright 
totalitarian pretensions. 
However, Neuhaus rejects the postmodernist challenge as a tool of helping 
Christians to resist such totalitarian pretensions. He deals with this problem in an 
extensive discussion about Richard Rorthy and the “age of irony” he symbolically 
represents. Neuhaus treats irony as a strategy to cope with the ubiquitous homeles-
sness of the modern age, morphed into postmodern suspicion of everything. This 
suspicion, bordering on a happy celebration of senselessness and despair, is ne-
vertheless a distinct form of response to that homelessness that is in fact inimical 
to Christianity. It is also a form of a modern faith, a default line of behavior in the 
face of disillusion and creeping despair, a road to nihilism and likely violence, not 
a meaningful response. Postmodernism is an attempt to see through all statements 
on reality as foundational statements and reduce them, including Christianity, to 
absurdity.”42
The postmodern liberal project is thus the most radical form of pushing Chri-
stians beyond the public square, or all people who accept the classical concept of 
truth, by considering them not just in the wrong about reality, but as deluded, by the 
very fact of venturing into making any foundational statement. But another conse-
quence is the total destruction of meaningful language. Culture cannot thus teach 
us anything, will is everything, and the greatest fear is a fear of not being novel, 
the only form of distinction left to the postmodern man in the sea of nonsense in 
his own life.”43 For Rorthy everyone who is oriented in fundamental questions of 
42 Ibidem, p. 131.
43 Ibidem, p. 149–150.
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reality should be forced to privatize their project. By force, law, or ridicule, using 
the vocabulary of political correctness which today begins to assume the role of 
a tool not of communication but of repression, with such words as “tolerance”, “non-
judgmentalism”, “diversity”, or “opinionated”. Rorthy also cannot bear the fact that 
his type of irony – being in fact a mélange of old vocabularies and traditions, unless 
we assume that his reason achieved an absolute point of neutral observation – may 
be just nothing, meaning nothing to the people whose innermost longing of reason 
or heart push them into the existing traditions, whose ontological status is, by Ror-
thy’s standards, exactly the same as the ironic self-destructive narratives of his will. 
But it is nonsense to assume that such narratives do not come from old narra-
tives, but claim to be transcending them, since by Rorthy’s atheistic standards they 
may only result from blind chemical reactions resulting in self-destruction.44 From 
the point of view of orthodox Christians and, Neuhaus adds, observant Jews, the 
post-modernists do not even entertain the notion of the existence of such a voca-
bulary. For him everything “just happened”, including the appearance of the notion 
that everything just happened. But Christians and Jews, even if they cannot prove 
the compelling reasons by which they are persuaded to choose such justified beliefs, 
believe that in the end it will be proven that not everything just happened. That Chri-
stian eschatology, and as a consequence anthropology, does not terminate in the self. 
Rorthy’s caricature of religion, including above all Christianity, means that 
he is unable to understand the phenomenon of religion, considering it simply as 
a dead, overcome “language”. For him the postmodernist project seems to be the 
third stage of the Enlightenment, succeeding rationalism and Romanticism, but 
this is an illusion. Together with Descartes and Hume, Rorthy has as his major ene-
my the “Great Trinity” of enemies: religion, tradition and authority, which are just 
inherited, thus necessary to be discarded entities and the language which depicts 
them. Neuhaus shows that such a tradition is a part of the great movement of the 
rationalist Enlightenment. It is part of the general attitude of “liberation”, which 
after 1968 left philosophers’ studies and hit the streets with a demand for a political 
dismantling of all “oppressive” institutions. But such projects end where all pro-
jects of self-salvation end, in “moral autocreation” and a narcissistic justification of 
base desire, when nothing matters, except nice living decided by the “self”, outside 
of any conversation about the common purposes of human beings.45
For Neuhaus this is just a stale repetition of absolute skepticism and nihi-
lism, an utterly solipsistic guidance to life, since Rorthy concedes that he cannot 
prove that his narrative and its vocabulary are true, just best adjusted, pragmatic, 
so to speak. But with that, he has no reasoned criteria of any hierarchy of goods, 
what is better and what is worse, and his desire to continue his cherished liberal 
democracy is just hanging in the air.46 Neuhaus makes Rorthy’s story one of the 
44 Ibidem, p. 155–156.
45 Ibidem, p. 157.
46 Ibidem, p. 159–161.
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central threats for liberal civilization in his American Babylon narrative. This is so 
because it constitutes one example of the much more serious intellectual and moral 
disarray in which Western culture found itself, which needs to be countered with 
“hope which gives reasons”. Not, adds Neuhaus, because people should accept 
them without any conditions, but because this is the only response to despair and 
the only chance to support the liberal democratic regime, which, lacking ubiquitous 
narratives like that, does not have any justification why anybody should defend it.47 
Postmodernism is a dead end solution, and although Neuhaus was an enemy 
of the secular rationalism eliminating religion that is equally aggressive in its ope-
ration, he had no doubts that religious believers should never side with reconstruc-
tionists, even if ostensibly they battle the hegemonic pretensions of the Enligh-
tenment. One cannot use Nietzsche or Rorthy to battle Voltaire, warned Neuhaus, 
since the totalitarian pretensions of the secular reason cannot be battled by nihilists. 
They do not care. The new secular totalitarians can be battled only by people who 
believe that this world has sense and a meaning, that there is truth about reality and 
that truth is a source which can be rationally searched for, but only found with love.
Secular humanists, the idea of progress, and Christianity today 
This brings Neuhaus to the greatest feud today: between secularists, or secular 
humanists, or atheists, and religious people, or to put it better the people of the 
transcendent God. Secular humanists are typically those who acknowledge no re-
ality that transcends the saeculum, meaning the temporal order. In this view, all 
that was and is to be confined within the limits of history. But do such humanists, 
can such humanists, live without hope? Some kind of eschatology, a vision of what 
might be and perhaps will be, a sense of destination in which history culminates in 
the true community for which we long, is inherent in the thought and action of all 
serious people. Thoughtful humanists know that this longing, this presupposition of 
purposeful action, has again and again ended up in utopian irrelevance, chaos and 
tyranny. They want no more of that. What are they to do with this hope that will 
not go away and cannot be discarded without risking the loss of their humanity, and 
how are they rationally to explain it? Many invest their hope in historical progress, 
and moral progress at that.48 Few things are so constitutive of modern secularism as 
the idea that progress, which means essentially incessant change, is 
[...] to something better … it has an end … what the Greek called a telos. … Change is 
[thus] good because it is a movement toward the better on history’s way toward some unspecified, 
and perhaps unspecifiable good. Such is an article of faith in the mindset we call modern.49
47 Ibidem, p. 162.
48 Ibidem, p. 244.
49 Ibidem, p. 59.
98 ANDRZEJ BRYK
Christians do not believe in the uninterrupted triumphal march of history, 
“experience both … personal and social is crucifixion; it is the way of the cross. At 
the same time, the cross is not the final word. There is resurrection”.50 For the se-
cularist, somehow on the road of that historical progress a compelling moral sense 
of right and wrong would emerge. But in fact, observed Neuhaus, what could only 
emerge is an interplay of utility mixed with power to hasten history. The Enlighte-
ned rationalism decoupled history and progress from the transcendental commands 
and rationality in search of moral sense, apart from metaphysics, so moral virtues 
can be created. Instead it began to slide into the nihilism of postmodernism, the 
rationalized irrationality which claims at the same time to possess an insight where 
history is going, and that this history is moral and accumulating moral progress. 
But this is sheer nonsense. There were attempts to produce ethics to which ratio-
nal persons, acting rationally, must give assent, then they failed. The best known 
here was of course the Kantian attempt. If they produced, sometimes, and in some 
places, decent societies, it was because society was for a time able to live off the 
capital of earlier traditions of virtue. But now the capital has been depleted. The 
failure of the Enlightenment moral project has not come with a moral triumph, 
but moral nihilism and acedia, with a corresponding desperate default line, of gro-
unding morality in an auto-creation of the autonomous, imperial Self defined as 
a basis of human dignity. That is why post-modernity is nothing new, but a version 
of modernity which failed, and the nihilistic avant-garde is a regression to the rule 
of barbarians. Neuhaus points out that barbarians today, as in classical Greece, are 
defined as those who are 
[...] outside the civilizational circle of conversation about how we ought to order our life 
together, about the meaning of right and wrong, good and evil. They are those who know nothing 
and insist that nothing can be known about such matters. Yet they admit that we have no choice 
but to choose, to act upon our preference, in the full awareness that we can appeal to no authority 
beyond our willing it to be so.51
It may be the case that such barbarians will dominate within the liberal de-
mocracy, that they will define the monistic parameters of liberalism for a long time. 
Those who are called barbarians are not overt primitives; they resemble more the 
gentle, cultivated nihilists of ancient Rome, with diplomas from the most distingu-
ished universities certifying that they are supposedly “the brightest and the best”. 
But this, Neuhaus points out, entirely misses the point. The new barbarians are 
[...] not barbarians because of the hypersophistication with which they have removed them-
selves from … the civilizational circle of moral conversation. In simplest terms, we may speak of 
“traditional values”. The barbarians refuse to be limited by what we know, by the wisdom we have 
received, and good and evil, right and wrong. For them the past is merely a prelude. The wisdom of 
50 Ibidem, p. 73.
51 Ibidem, p. 79.
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history is disenfranchised. Only the present gets a vote. …What the powerful agree to call truth is 
what we will to be. In the beginning is not the Word but the Act. Truth is not discerned or discovered 
but is the product of our acting, knowing all the while that the action we call “choice” in only an 
illusion, for all our thinking, choosing, and acting is, in turn, the product of those little synapses in 
the brain following their predetermined course. And so it is that Nietzsche in his apparent triumph 
is finally defeated as the will to power is exposed in all its pitiful impotence one cannot be both. We 
cannot be, at the same time, both the captives and the masters of nature.52
What then, asks Neuhaus, for the claims of materialists and liberal monists 
that there is moral progress in history and that they know how to introduce it, if 
only they created conditions for each to exercise their autonomous will, liberated 
from the “oppressions” of religion, tradition, culture in general. Then they would 
base human moral progress on a preconceived will of a perfect moral order. There 
is, of course,
[...] no doubt that within a particular civilizational circle, there is moral progress, and re-
gress [sic!] in how we live, but there is no progress in the sense of moving beyond the moral truths 
that constitute the circle itself we can develop not further implications of those truths, or we can step 
outside the circle by denying that there is such a thing as moral truth.53
Our times are hyper-sophisticated intellectually and with that we have paint-
ed ourselves into a moral Mexican  corner, a modern Pontius Pilate rendition of the 
question “What is truth?” Neuhaus stands for permanent truths which he shows no 
hesitation in calling natural law, visible for instance in the principles of the Declara-
tion of Independence. But such principles are also called first principles in ethics, 
and by definition are always first. For the moral analysis to go beyond or behind 
them would require an assumption that human consciousness can go beyond or be-
hind itself. Of course such first principles draw support from all religious and moral 
traditions in inculcating certain rules, since these are the axioms that constitute the 
civilizational circle.
The most corrosive attack on such principles, as Neuhaus points out, is mod-
ern hermeneutics of suspicion, which comes from rudimentary Marxism, which 
claims that every rule, or law, or custom is perceived to have behind it some hidden 
purpose, power protecting its own interests. As a consequence, commands and lim-
its are “explained away”, to the cheering of many contemporaries, for whom this 
seeing through the first principles of ethics is exactly to see nothing, which means 
to see that there is nothing except what we will to do. So speak, points out Neuhaus, 
“the barbarians among us…”54
These modern barbarians, often in Armani suits, are fundamentally wrong, 
also because – Neuhaus follows here in the footsteps of Pope Benedict XVI in his 
2007 encyclical Spe Salvi [Saved in Hope] – to talk about progress in a materialistic 
52 Ibidem, p. 80–81.
53 Ibidem, p. 81.
54 Ibidem, p. 83.
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sense, as if the historical march would secure us higher and higher plateaus of our 
once and for all “won freedoms” and “morals”, is a fundamental error. In the sphere 
of ethical awareness and first of all moral decision, there is no accumulation, since 
each man’s freedom is always unique. It is new and must be utilized anew. Such 
decisions can never be made in advance by others, since if they were, our freedom 
would be taken from us. Those who think that history aims at a particular point, 
and that they carry with them an awareness of a better moral future progressively 
attached, are prone, less or more consciously, to treat others who are not with them 
as simpletons, or corrupt. They should thus be nudged, by different means, towards 
progressive morality. But that would be an abolition of freedom.55 
Neuhaus then looks at the recent and absolutely unexpected spate of books 
written by atheists, which have acquired enormous media prominence. One would 
assume that such a type of atheistic literature, with fury matching its sterile and 
shallow arguments, was gone with the “village atheists” of the end of the 19th cen-
tury. One would also assume that in the West, with secularization theory taken for 
granted, such literature would be redundant for sophisticates. But Neuhaus realizes 
that this is a new situation, and it signifies “a last gasp of angry protest against 
a world that is becoming ever more overtly religious”,56 since secularization has 
evidently not gone hand in hand with modernization, Europe being just an excep-
tion confirming the observation. Yet although secularization theory failed as a tool 
of explanation of the modernized world, it could be right in the sense that the old 
way of expressing religious convictions could be gone. 
Religion in such a case would become more unorthodox, more individual-
istic, more “spiritual”, so to speak. But at the same time there is a growing enmity 
between the secularized elites and the religious masses, an old problem of Europe 
and a new phenomenon in America.57 But a pitting of faith against reason and be-
lief against knowledge was at the same time connected with another subtle distinc-
tion, between something which was legitimately public and something which was 
private, and thus definitely illegitimate in public. In this way of thinking, shows 
Neuhaus, there is 
[...] a radical departure from the public nature of religion, whether that religion has to do 
with the ancient gods of the city or with the biblical Lord who rules the nations the gods of the city 
and the God of the Bible are emphatically public. The confinement of the question of God or of the 
gods to the private sphere constitutes what might be described as political atheism many today who 
are believers in private have been persuaded, or intimidated, into accepting political atheism. This 
powerfully contributes to … the naked public square.58
55 Ibidem, p. 84–85.
56 Ibidem, p. 88.
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One should add that this crop of new atheistic vitriol which has unexpectedly 
been visible of late might not be as irrational as Neuhaus thought. It constitutes the 
latest action on the part of the secularized elites, this time by proxy, to show their 
utter impatience towards people of belief. In other words, the 18th-century antireli-
gious tracts engaged in a modicum of argument over ideas. Today’s atheists simply 
show furious impatience towards not so much beliefs, as believers as people who 
refuse to see the light, resisting a future of progressive education. Contemporary 
atheism is as much an intellectual – or, one should say, quasi-intellectual – effort as 
it is first of all a political effort to eliminate believers totally from public life so they 
cease to conspire to subvert the march of progress. It is, in other words, an ideology 
in the service of naked power.
Neuhaus thinks that this might be, unfortunately, the future of Western in-
tellectual culture. This culture will allow only the post-Enlightenment language of 
monistic liberalism, the dominant form of public discourse today. It has abandoned 
all pretenses to any search for a foundational justification of its claim to political 
and cultural monopoly, accepting an exclusivist anthropology of the imperial Self 
creating morality in a process of auto-creation. In a process of such monistic redefi-
nition it tries to redefine its own human rights culture accordingly. The free market 
is an ideal here. The liberal, free market of everything, overseeing by means of 
a liberal state a homeostasis between Christians, Jews, Muslims, Marxists, Nietz-
schians, utilitarians, devotees of Mother Gaia, and transsexuality, so they would 
not overstep the boundaries of a liberal certified discourse. This is a society in the 
image of a great university class, where under the teacher’s supervision all points 
are freely discussed, and then all go for a beer. Such an intellectual discussion is 
another instance of modish fads which currently saturate the public square with 
such words as “diversity”, “multiculturalism” or tolerance, or the right never “to 
be offended”.59
Neuhaus asks the question, scandalous from the point of view of such moni-
stic liberalism, “Can these atheists be good citizens?” This is a striking question for 
modern liberal sensibilities awash with a vocabulary studded with words such as 
“tolerance”, “non-discrimination”, or “non-judgmentalism”. Neuhaus does not say 
that only religious people can be good citizens. After all he was one of the harshest 
critics, albeit rational, of corruption in the American Church in the wake of the 
pedophile scandal in 2001 and 2002. Neuhaus does not want to say that an atheist 
cannot be an exemplary moral person. Yet it all hangs on the definition of who is 
a citizen, and what are the ultimate bases of the liberal order. He realizes that the 
question whether atheists can be good citizens 
[...] engages concerns that go beyond individual rectitude or moral and intellectual serio-
usness. As a generality, can people who do not acknowledge that they are accountable to a truth 
higher than the self, a truth that is not dependent upon the self, really be trusted?60 
59 Ibidem, p. 102.
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As Neuhaus stresses, politics in its nature, if not always in its practice, was 
and is fundamentally a moral enterprise, whether we want it or not, by conscious 
intent or by default. In 1787 as today, questions of “oughtness” are moral questions, 
and the very vocabulary of politics is definitely moral, since we 
[...] debate what is right and what is wrong, what is fair and what is unfair, what serves and 
what disserves the common good. In any society, moral judgments draw upon the deepest beliefs 
and convictions held by the people of that society. In America and most of the world, those be-
liefs and convictions are inseparable from religious traditions. This may seem self-evident to most 
readers, but in fact it touches on questions that continue to be hotly contested. It is true that the 
Constitution establishes a secular order of government. The word “secular” derives from the Latin 
saeculum, which means the present time. To say that this govern, and is secular is to say that it is for 
the present time; it is a temporal order. It is for the city of man, not the City of God. The American 
founders did not establish this constitutional order to be a church, although for some secularists it 
may be the closest thing they have to a church. This constitutional order is temporal, provisional, 
for the time being. It is not the New Jerusalem.61
The aggressive secular movement trying to capture and redefine American 
history is an object of Neuhaus’ concern. It persuades Americans that the history 
of their country was a secular, anti-religious enterprise. But America is an “incor-
rigibly and pervasively religious society”.62 The social compact of 1787 was and 
is premised upon a sense of covenantal purpose guiding this novus ordo seclorum. 
Can an atheist, asks Neuhaus provocatively, be a citizen in such a nation? Of course 
he can be a citizen, and unreflexively a decent one, but he cannot be a good citizen. 
Such a citizen is dependent on others who sustain such a compact in which he can 
have a “free ride”. Neuhaus has a heroic, romantic image of Christianity and of 
American republican government. Christianity and citizenship are linked as two 
kinds of active stance towards public life, challenging its slide towards moral indif-
ference and utter privatization. Moreover, this is an image of reality which needs to 
be defended by citizens in loyalty to their republic, not because it is theirs, stronger, 
or defending their interests better. This is the kind of a debased patriotism which 
Neuhaus abhors. America is a regime worth supporting, not because it is strong or 
belongs to Americans, but because it is moral, despite all its concrete foibles, stupi-
dities and crimes committed in history, the idea so well captured in the Declaration 
of Independence. That is why an atheist citizen “cannot be a good citizen”, because 
he cannot give a compelling reason why he or she should sustain such a public or-
der and towards what end, except as a simple framework sustained for security and 
consumption reasons, both rooted in egotistical individual wishes.63
Neuhaus is aware that there are atheists, and then there are atheists. There are 
many who are morally earnest, as were the protagonists of Albert Camus’s novels, 
whom he calls “saints without God”. But there are the “new atheists” who exult in 
61 Ibidem, p. 109.
62 Ibidem, p. 115.
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assaulting religiously grounded foundations of the republican order. They glorify 
transgressive ways of thinking and behavior. From their indulgence and suppo-
sedly sophisticated, but in fact shallow superiority, which they equate with moral 
probity, they scandalize the religious people. But at the same time they preach their 
“warped” new religion of nothingness. This new breed of atheists fights not only 
with faith and arguments for it. New Atheists do not have such arguments, and the 
arguments they have are as primitive as they can be. In reality they fight religious 
people who allegedly offend their convictions that such people should not exist, 
since their truncated reason tells them that such a possibility is a rational impossi-
bility. By religious people they mean of course mainly Christians and Christianity. 
But they are wrong, because those who
[...] adhere to the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Jesus turn out to be the best citizens. 
Those who were once called [in imperial Roman times] “atheists” are now the most persuasive 
defenders not of the gods but of the good reasons for this regime of ordered liberty. They are that 
not despite the fact that their loyalty to this polis is qualifies by a higher loyalty, but because of it. 
… The best of the good reasons they give in defending this regime is that it makes a sharply limited
claim upon the loyalty of its citizens. The ultimate allegiance of the faithful is not to the regime or 
to its constituting texts, but to the City of God and the sacred texts that guide our path toward that 
destination. We are dual citizens in a regime that … was designed for such duality. When the politi-
cal order forgets itself and reestablishes the gods of the polis, even if it does so in the name of liberal 
democracy, these citizens have no choice but to run the risk of once again being called “atheists”.64 
Neuhaus argues to those trying to destroy the morally given account why 
the American liberal regime is good and what its ultimate justifications are as de-
stroying the very basis of the regime which protects them in the first place. The 
new regime they are trying to create is a monistic regime where they are to be the 
new secular “priests” and their will for power grounded. All grounded solely in 
an imperial, self-explaining and circular morality of the imperial Self, its moral 
autocreation. The new atheists cannot give any compelling account in defense of 
the regime of which they are part. This is so because in democracy society and go-
vernment requires reasons. Community is communication; it depends on reasons 
that draw their authority from what transcends people, otherwise we are engaged 
in a life of sheer cheerful nihilism coupled with a debased utility. The new atheists 
represent a wrong, community-destroying way, which would also annihilate those 
who advocate such a society.
What, then, would be the conditions for a properly given moral account of 
why such a liberal regime as America should exist? What kind of civilizational 
circle of moral conversation is necessary, and what are the public conditions in 
which such a moral conversation could take place? Neuhaus realizes that the public 
square is a domain of politics and “politics is conflictual”. The true community is 
impossible in the polis, which is the “city of man”, since such a community is only 
the one in which human alienation will be finally fulfilled, which is tantamount 
64 Ibidem, p. 117.
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to this ideal state of living together in the truth.”65 Such is the price of wisdom in 
the “city of man” which is not cynicism but wisdom, which was also contained in 
the “genius of the American constitutional order”. This constitutional order allows 
us to combine political mundane operations with loftier aspirations, with a clear 
understanding at the same time that “aspirations are tethered to interests”. But this 
realism recognizes that it is usually best secured by the contest of mundane intere-
sts typically claiming to be in the service of The Public Interest.66
It is here that Neuhaus defends the absolute necessity of religious presence 
in the public square. His idea, put forth in 1984 in The Naked Public Square, was 
not to be understood as a call for action. As he points out, it was sometimes under-
stood as a call to engage in political activity in a direct way. For him 
[...] the alternative to the naked public square – meaning public life stripped of religion 
and religiously grounded argument – is not the sacred public square, but the civil public square. 
The sacred public square is located in the New Jerusalem the best that can be done in Babylon is to 
maintain, usually with great difficulty. The best that can be done in Babylon is to maintain, usually 
with great difficulty, a civil public square. In the civil public square, all have a right to participate 
– not only because they are citizens so entitled by this constitutional order, but also, and more fun-
damentally, because we recognize that they are possessed of a human dignity that cannot be denied 
without threatening the ever fragile earthly city on which we all depend.67
Neuhaus presents several reasons here for why the public presence of reli-
gion is thus necessary for the maintenance of a free, democratic order.
This religious, Judeo-Christian voice is one of the most important public 
voices, because it is rational, and its verity is grounded in realism about human 
existence. Thus, aggressive secularism, which tries to eliminate Judeo-Christian 
biblical religion from the public square, constitutes a totalitarian attempt to mono-
polize the definition about human existence and then impose it by politics and law 
on the public square. This is definitely not a voice for a proper separation of a state 
and religion. Religious people have the right to participate in public life, because 
this is a fundamental life which stems both from their human dignity and from their 
citizenship, which implicitly has to recognize the equality of everyone in public 
life. The argument that citizens could enter the public square while separating their 
religious beliefs from their public activity, a standard secularist argument which has 
become a staple of monistic, totalitarian liberalism, is unfounded on two counts. 
One, it has to define religion as a kind of private hobby, or a kind of superstition 
which someone must abandon while entering the public square. This is the most 
primitive and ignorant understanding of what biblical religion is. Moreover, this is 
the most paternalistic, unequal and concession-type definition of citizenship created 
on a false premise, from which then the public life is constructed, with a distinction 
65 Ibidem, p. 184–185.
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of a legitimate and an illegitimate activity. But an argument which stems from false 
axioms, which are themselves axioms of a secular “religion” grounded in this anti-
religious prejudice, cannot constitute the basis for a civilized discussion. Religion 
is not a private thing, but a personal thing, and as such it is constitutive of personali-
ty as a whole, that is of human dignity. That is true, such a religious public presence 
must give reasoned argument while it engages in public activity, and Neuhaus is 
adamant that such an argument can be given, since the Judeo-Christian message is 
rational, it is realism per se. 
Modern secular liberal monism is based on an old delusion of rationalism, 
and because of that bias it thinks that only it represents rationality. Religion, in fact 
Christianity, was defined as totally irrational. The secularists who think that only 
they represent rationality and by those criteria that religiously grounded argument, 
the argument of biblical religion, is nonsensical, have a primitive and truncated 
notion of limited rationality. Their argument is ideological, anti-democratic, anti-
freedom and, in the worst and true sense of the word, elitist, or one should say Gno-
stic. Gnostic, that is conveying an idea that there is a self-defined and self-imposed 
elite which possesses the key to the meaning of reality. This elite allegedly has the 
right to tell others that they should follow their idea how the public argument can be 
framed, the polity construed, and how religious people should define their religion 
so they can be allowed into the public square. Of course not all religions are treated 
that way, but in fact, only Christianity. Not only prejudiced perception is at stake 
here. Neuhaus implies on many occasions that Christianity is treated in such a way 
because it is in fact the only competitor to the monistic pretensions of the modern 
state which may be a carrier of the new, exclusivist ideology of monistic liberalism, 
of which the anthropological basis is the imperial Self. This imperial Self as the 
key to secular, post-1968 anthropology and as the basis of the increasingly liberal 
human rights doctrine is obviously a competitor to Christian anthropology, and 
obviously arbitrarily declared as true. Such a liberal, monistic argument is ideolo-
gical to the core, posing at the same time as rationality.
But rationality is inescapably connected with the real, that is the Being. Neu-
haus is a realist. Monistic liberalism is against reality, proof of which might be the 
constant recourse to symbolic violence to keep its monopoly of power. For this 
very reason, in the civil public square, all have the right to participate, not only 
because what is at stake is essentially the question of dignity of human beings. It is 
because there they can be subjected to a test of a rigorous public argument. In this 
process a real dignity can be protected – not spurious dignity synonymous with the 
whims of the imperial Self, but human dignity which can only thrive in the true re-
cognition of what a human being is and its human, potential nature. The discussion 
is not about a religiously grounded argument; it is about a fundamental anthropolo-
gical and ontological argument as well, thus deciding the predicament of humanity. 
Christianity constitutes here, claims Neuhaus, the most important way by 
which the reality of the human condition is rightly understood. For this reason, 
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a properly understood civil public square needs religious people on grounds of 
equality, but not because they are fully-fledged citizens, but by the fact of their con-
trolling all of the reasons why they are citizens in such a liberal order in the first pla-
ce.68 This means that this earthly city of the liberal order is just a technical way of 
securing the ultimate human freedom and thus human dignity, the very essence, in 
turn, of the biblical God’s gift to each person. Politics is in such a case inescapable, 
because it is a way of ensuring that warfare is carried on by other means, reflecting 
[...] the intense conflict over differing visions of American culture, over the ideas and ideals 
that ought to shape our common life. For the sake of maintaining the civil public square, culture 
warriors on all sides … are called to sharpen their arguments rather than their swords. This is espe-
cially the case with respect to the inescapable interaction of religion and politics … Politics is pri-
marily a function of culture, … at the heart of culture is morality, and … at the heart of morality are 
those commanding truths typically associated with religion. I [think] it is true in every society, but it 
is certainly true in this society, that politics and religion can be distinguished but never separated.69
If state interest is put above others, then such a state constitutes a return to 
a pre-Christian understanding of a state which has total sovereignty over its sub-
jects, including religious beliefs, being dictated by Caesar. Such a danger is present 
today with an attempt to return to a monistic concept of sovereignty, and attempts 
of both the secular fanatics as well as religious fanatics to impose their order, thus 
to execute a confluence of a state with religion. This is “politics inspired by religio-
us belief” in the worst possible sense.70
Politics thus engages and should engage all problems which come from hu-
man existence, with foibles, stupidities, errors politically expressed, but the deepest 
question with which contemporary politics has to deal, according to Neuhaus, is 
the issue of “what it means to be a human being”. Although this is not an overtly 
political question, the dissolution of the common anthropological framework in the 
post-1968 world has made it so. If we rephrase this question, however, and 
[...] put it in terms who is a bearer of rights that we, as a society, are obliged to respect, it 
is turned into a political question and must be addressed as such. And so we have center–staged in 
today’s political arena what are commonly called the “life questions”. They are typically posed in 
terms of conflict between individual freedom, on the one side, and the dignity of the human person, 
on the other. But the arguments invoking freedom and those invoking dignity can cut in surprising 
directions.71 
For Neuhaus “life questions” are the fundamental questions engaged mainly 
by bioethics. It is here that problems connected with the present and proposed tech-
nical manipulations of the humanum, in other words of what it means to be human, 
impose themselves most dramatically in the public square.72 
68 Ibidem, p. 187.
69 Ibidem, p. 188.
70 Ibidem, p. 189.
71 Ibidem.
72 Ibidem, p. 190.
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The great dispute today – probably the greatest, claims Neuhaus – is over 
the idea of human dignity. Such a concept should be useful in discussing bioethical 
issues, but in fact it is being used today more to cloud clear thinking about the pow-
ers and responsibilities that shape the human future. If we ask the question whether 
the idea of human dignity is useful, there is an immediate question which follows: 
[...] useful for what? In this context we are asking whether it is politically useful. This is the 
great question over which [modern liberal democracies] are locked in civil argument.73
Neuhaus realizes that Western civilization’s reflection about ethics and mo-
rality is focused on the maxim “do good and avoid evil” or “do right and avoid 
wrong”, from which stems the principle of practical moral reason in obedience to 
that maxim to direct one’s will in accord with the human good. He realizes, then, that 
in such cases human good is served by respect for human dignity. But this is exactly 
the modern point of contention, visible if the argument is phrased in another way:
[...] if we speak not of human dignity but the dignity of the human person. The phrase 
human dignity may suggest the human collective and include efforts such as taking technological 
charge of the evolution of the human species. The dignity of the human person places the accent 
on the individual … to be sure, the individual situated in society, and, one hopes, in society that 
aspires to being community … Respect for dignity of others includes treating them as rational 
creatures capable of being persuaded by rational argument, even in the face of frequent evidence 
to the contrary. This is notably the case with respect to policy questions touching on the dignity of 
the most human persons.74 
Neuhaus is convinced that the most salient contemporary issue where the 
dignity of the human person is at stake is abortion and the issues related to it. He 
terms abortion to be the most consequential political event of the past half-century. 
Here, in American Babylon the issue received especially moving treatment, as if 
constituting a fitting closing of a journey of a man who had begun his career as an 
activist at the side of Martin Luther King for the cause of the downtrodden. The 
fight against abortion turned into a fight of the same order as the fight for civil 
rights in America, and Neuhaus contributed enormously to making this fight all-
important.
Neuhaus opposed abortion for moral as well as constitutional reasons. The 
moral case was straightforward to him. It touched the most fundamental politi-
cal question of who the Americans were as a community. He defended the unborn 
on the basis of the dignity of the human person. A basic political question stem-
ming from the moral one was: who belonged to the community, and whom did the 
American republic take under its protection? “Roe v. Wade” of 1973 was thus both 
a moral and a political act, since it radically redefined the political community by 
redefining its moral responsibility. It was also a profoundly anti-political decision, 
73 Ibidem.
74 Ibidem, p. 190, 197.
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since the Supreme Court usurped to itself the definition of that community beyond 
a democratic mandate. In that, it also defined a new anthropology and a morality 
of the autonomous imperial Self, creating a new right. By doing that the Supreme 
Court in fact gave the power of defining what life is, and giving a decision what to 
do with this life, to an individual woman.
On constitutional grounds the 1973 “Roe v. Wade” decision was an exercise 
in “raw judicial power”, in clear contravention of the constitutional mandate. The 
real problem with these decisions was that they “removed a preeminently political, 
which is to say moral, question from public deliberation.”75 The Supreme Court 
took an explosive moral and political issue from political discussion in the public 
square. Once abortion, practically on demand, became a constitutional right, all 
those who considered it unacceptable and wanted to keep it as an open moral issue 
were immediately defined as anti-constitutional, and delegitimized in the public 
square. The issue concerned not only the immediate abortion decision, but a total 
redefinition of liberal anthropology which put many people in dramatic situations, 
closing a democratic debate.
For Neuhaus, therefore, the moral question was an unavoidable fundamental 
political question. The Court removed questions about obligations of the commu-
nity and definition of that community from its verdict in “Roe v. Wade”. But in fact 
it made an overt political decision in all such areas, turning the issue of abortion, 
settled for centuries of civilizational tradition which was part of American tradition 
too, into a battlefield. It did this by simply stating that the moral tradition which 
claimed that it was morally wrong to kill innocent people was not valid any more, 
and established a tradition that it was right to kill them. 
The Court thus redefined morality, but it did this because it unequivocally re-
defined the anthropology on which the traditional morality rested. With that the Co-
urt put forth a new definition of who a human being as a subject of morality was to 
be. From now on it was to be a total sovereign of his or her own morality, outside of 
community, outside of tradition, outside of moral reasoning. The raw autonomous 
imperial Self was a source of all decisions concerning moral issues, including the 
fetus. This new anthropology was officially declared in the 1992 decision “Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey”. The Court thus redefined the entire culture, according to 
a new anthropology put forth by the most radical feminist lobby, adjusting the enti-
re constitutional tradition to it and falsifying history. At the same time it nominated 
itself as an arbiter of life and death, by settings the criteria of distinction for good, 
since allegedly derived from the fundamental law of the Constitution.76 
But his point goes deeper, namely that under the regime of “Roe” there are 
no clear and unambiguous rules which exclude such horrors from being contem-
75 Ibidem, p. 198.
76 The best exposition of the entire legal and moral revolution wrought by the Court, including falsifica-
tions of history, was done by F. J. Beckwick, Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice, 
New York 2007.
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plated. That is, if we accept the anthropology of the imperial Self as a basis of right, 
and as a basis of shaping other rights, there is no way the utilitarian logic of looking 
at society at large cannot creep in. This would happen not because of some con-
spiracy, but simply because there would be no cultural taboos which were thought 
inconceivable. The moral autonomy of the imperial Self can always be put forth for 
the entire rational argument why certain things may happen and why they should 
happen. But this constitutes a rational justification of a sheer desire for convenien-
ce. Apart from a subversion of the deeply entrenched concept of dignity of the 
human person, the Supreme Court also redefined the meaning of the foundational 
documents of the United States, especially the Declaration of Independence, with 
its unequivocal commitment to natural rights. The question was thus 
[...] who belongs to the community for which we as a community accept responsibility, 
including the responsibility to protect, along with other natural rights, their right to life? This is 
a preeminently political question. It is not a question to be decided by bioethicists [or for that instan-
ce the Supreme Court judges]. Bioethicists [may] help inform political deliberations … but these 
questions are – rightly and of necessity – to be decided.77
For Neuhaus it was obvious that “the people who are the American polis” 
were attached to the concept of the dignity of the human person. Yet, warned Neu-
haus, what we might have experienced here was a subtle revolt of the elites against 
their own people, when the former tell the latter that their popular attachments are 
either prejudices, unreflexive biases, or false consciousness which need to be cle-
ared off their heads, as having no legitimate place in an authentic, that is defined by 
them, public discourse.78 This happened in the case of a huge portion of the public 
which has never accepted the “Roe v. Wade” verdict. It also just happened that 
such elites seemed to represent the contrary views and values to the majority of the 
American society, a view coming from the 1968 radical generation. 
Neuhaus points to the dangerous potential of such a monistic liberalism, sin-
ce the moral authority of those who would usurp for themselves a creation of rules 
of those who might be admitted and those who should be excluded from the public 
discourse is, at best very fuzzy, at worst totalitarian in nature. They are rightly per-
ceived as such by a large section of the American people, who try to organize from 
bottom up to thwart such monistic attempts.79
Neuhaus is aware that in most cases which are related to ordering an ordi-
nary life of a community, an invocation of moral reality beyond what is required 
for the resolution of a particular issue at hand is not necessary. But in the case of 
bioethics this is an entirely new game. Here people who are devoutly religious 
may advance in the public square arguments that are not distinctively religious in 
77 Ibidem, p. 201.
78 The concept of the revolt of the elites was introduced by C. Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites and the 
Betrayal of Democracy, New York 1995.
79 Ibidem, p. 203–204.
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character. They may for instance use natural law theory. Neuhaus defends here the 
theory of natural law, since
[...] contrary to whatever critics of natural law may say, the theory and its practice are not 
discredited by the observation that many, if not most, of the practitioners do in fact have definite 
ideas on sources and ends. Nor is the theory discredited by being widely perceived as a distincti-
vely Catholic theory, which it is not. To the extent it is perceived that way … its proponents can 
readily respond that a distinctively catholic contribution to our common life is to have preserved 
a universal understanding of reason that, being universal, is in no way peculiarly Catholic. It is an 
understanding that has strong roots in the Aristotelian view of politics and public discourse under 
discussion here.80
As for Americans, Neuhaus observes, religion and morality are inextricably 
intertwined. He understands at the same time that such universal arguments can 
appeal only to people who have a comprehensive, universal approach to human 
existence, to people who are morally serious, not just stating that what counts for 
them is a utilitarian approach or simple a hedonistic life devoid of burdens. Thus 
we have here a problem of how to invoke in public arguments an explicitly Chris-
tian or Jewish moral tradition derived from Scripture, so as to persuade others. 
One may say that religious people here have in the public square an obligation to 
present their arguments in a form that is public, which means that they should be 
accessible to all reasonable parties. This is an argument, for instance, found in such 
liberal-left authors as Jürgen Habermas or John Rawls, one which Neuhaus consid-
ers both unreasonable and unfair. Such a demand is not imposed on any other sector 
or institution of a society. All such institutions and groups, feminists, labor unions, 
environmental groups, gays and others are expected to advance their interests with-
out giving any a priori justifications of their position. 
They argue as if they were engaging in a discussion based on a universal lan-
guage. In fact it is often a secular language based on a particular ideology masked 
as a rational thought. There is no reason why churches could not frame arguments 
supporting their interests the same way, simply on the understanding that they are 
another interest group and they have their rights to engage as such. But there is also 
another sort of discrimination. This is an argument that a distinctly theological lan-
guage is worthless as a moral proposition. This means that, for instance, allegedly 
any language of any ethics liberal-left professor at any university, whether John 
Rawls, or Ronald Dworkin, or Martha Nussbaum, formulating his or her system 
based on, let’s say, Kant’s or any other self-contained system, is of higher legitima-
cy than the moral argument of Judeo-Christian ethics, which built the entire ethical, 
universal civilization in the first place. 
But this is, as Neuhaus pointed out, a classical case of the tyranny of a mi-
nority, about which Tocqueville cautioned. This minority defined itself as the elite 
which decided to wage war on the majority of ordinary people in the false convic-
80 Ibidem, p. 205.
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tion that because they are more educated and intelligent, then they are at the same 
time more moral and wise. It may be suspected that precisely the opposite might be 
true today. Such elites seem to usurp to themselves prerogatives of the once Gnostic 
elite, which nominated itself to be possessors of a secret truth, which would be reve-
aled to the simpletons led by them. Thus today, warned Neuhaus, caution is needed 
in relation to
[...] the minority that would impose a rule that authentically public discourse be methodo-
logically atheistic. [But in fact] restraint, civility, and disciplined reason are seriously undermined 
by the hostility to “comprehensive accounts” in our public discourse-especially if they are perceived 
to be religious in nature. In most intellectual enterprises, and not least in ethics there is a propensity 
to emulate the methodologies and exactitudes associated with the physical sciences … [But] the 
concept of the dignity of the human person was arrived at, and is today sustained, by … a different 
form of understanding. It is a form of understanding that is carefully reasoned, and frankly moral, 
and for most people who affirm it, it is in fact, if not by theoretical necessity, inseparable from 
a comprehensive account that is unapologetically acknowledged as religious. the hostility to admit 
this account to public discourse is long-standing … It has long been argued by some that moral refe-
rences should be eliminated altogether from law and public policy, that [modern liberal-democratic 
polity] is a strictly procedural polity devoted only to means and prescinding from ends … But, of 
course, it was by ideas and experiences outside the law that the concept of the dignity of the human 
person was enshrined in the law.81 
Neuhaus claims that the concept of the dignity of the human person depends 
on a universal understanding of a human person which is 
[...] a person possessed of a dignity we are obliged to respect at every point of development, 
debilitation, or decline by virtue of being created in the image and likeness of God. Endowed with 
the spiritual principle of the soul, with reason and with free will, the destiny of the person who acts 
in accord with moral conscience in obedience to the truth is nothing less than eternal union with 
God. This is the dignity of the human person that is to be respected, defended and indeed revered.82
Neuhaus is aware that this is a very comprehensive concept of human digni-
ty, but he thinks that it can be accepted by all, on the basis of the properly understo-
od freedom principle. This freedom principle in the West has been clashing, at least 
since the 16th century, with a monistic concept of the modern. This modern concept 
of sovereignty was conceptually a great return to pre-Christian times, when the 
unity of the state and society was complete and there was no external standard of 
judgment, let alone institutional limitation of state power. But the Christian idea of 
divided sovereignty, with sacrum and profanum, destroyed that unity, and introdu-
ced into Western culture the idea that a state is a dependent institution, subject to 
external judgment and in fact limited in its scope, also by the power of the universal 
Catholic Church.
81 Ibidem, p. 208 –209.
82 Ibidem, p. 210.
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Modernity returned to the unified concept of sovereignty through the co-
nversion of divine law to the laws on nature, or natural rights instead of natural law, 
and then this law of nature would become free of any association with divinity as 
such, it would be rejected for human self-legislation, which would become an exc-
lusive province of a sovereign state, and subject to manipulation and exploitation 
for its own purposes.83 With that, divine law, as a political concept and a function 
of this divine sovereignty, was pushed back by historicism into the remote, suppo-
sedly overcome, primitive past in an evolutionary scheme of progressive humanity. 
This self-declared emancipation from prejudice, with the latest stage of it in the 
post-1968 Western thought, became in such a case a logic of law and a logic of po-
wer of a modern state. It was first limited to the province of sheer politics, but soon 
it entered into all spheres of human life according to monistic liberalism’s slogan 
that the “private is political”. 
The concept of freedom of the human person which Christianity introduced 
was a sine qua non condition of the human person in its social and political sphere, 
that without that there would be no Western freedom at all. This external judgment 
to assess the legitimacy of a state was of course a judgment of the properly formed 
conscience grounded in the moral universal law of God via natural law, for which 
an absolutely essential element was the creation of an individual person with an in-
dividual conscience. The concept of a person means a revolution in consciousness 
unparalleled in history, since from now on any political power was not dealing with 
an undifferentiated mass of anonymous groups, forever subjected to impersonal 
whims of state power. It was from now on dealing with persons, each endowed 
with a name and individual face and under the protection of a personal God. Each 
was created in God’s image. This personal connection between each person and 
God took precedence and constituted a judgment on the actions of a state, which 
from now on lost any legitimate claim to the totality of a human person and his 
earthly life. Tyranny was annihilated in an instant, and although practical tyranny 
has often been a fact in history, it has never again been without a competitor, moral, 
intellectual and eventually institutional. 
The gradual desacralization of the public space, as a result of the catastrophic 
religious wars of the 16th century and the intellectual developments which placed 
the blame on religion – that is Christianity per se – and not on the political use of 
it, resulted in a return of the monistic concept of sovereignty. The rest, as they say, 
was history. Rights were substituted for natural law, the state for plurality of Chri-
stendom. But if the experiment did not thoroughly fail, at least it has several times 
produced calamities of modern ideological killings which were possible, since the 
very idea of inalienable personhood was simply brushed aside.84 The process went 
hand in hand with a gradual atheization of culture with the substitution of liberal 
rights for Christianity’s grounded rights. Finally, this atheization of the state and its 
83 See: L. Strauss, Natural Law in History, Chicago 1955.
84 R. J. Neuhaus, American Babylon…, p. 210–211.
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growing power was to be kept in check by the modern human rights doctrine, with 
human dignity rooted in all kinds of Kantian or neo-Kantian justifications, gradual-
ly more and more dubious as an effective justification imposing a universal willin-
gness to accept them. The crisis of the modern concept of human rights in relation 
to the monistic pretenses of modern liberalism based on the reigning anthropology 
of the imperial Self is more than evident.85
Liberal atheisation and the covenant story of the American Founding 
Neuhaus believes, after Murray, that America is different, in fact exceptional. 
Exceptional not only in a political sense but in a moral sense as well, since it has 
not yet abandoned this connection with the external justifications of personhood 
and rights, and has not made methodological atheism a sine qua non condition 
of the public discussion of right.86 The concept of human dignity in America has 
not been thoroughly subjected to gradual methodological atheization, meaning that 
secularization has not been able to reassert a sovereignty of the state with its own 
definition of what human dignity and what the human person was, as was attemp-
ted, for instance, by the “Roe v. Wade” (1973) and “Planned Parenthood v. Casey” 
(1992) decisions of the Supreme Court. 
Neuhaus thinks that America is in this regard a unique society, still faithful to 
the principles of the Declaration of Independence, and because of this promise in-
herent in its covenantal message, it is still truly an “almost chosen nation”. He does 
not reject the conventional, contractual theory of government, but is more attached 
to a covenantal theory of the American founding.87 He is not necessarily original 
here – the covenantal story of America was for a long time a staple of American 
civil religion intertwined with the Protestant cultural paradigm – but at the same 
time he thinks that this story has been forgotten, and that perilous consequences of 
that might follow. 
If America is a covenantal nation, “under God” – and this is so, as Neuhaus 
says with a straight face to secular accusers, who claim that he is a chauvinistic par-
ticularist, not universalist – this is because
[...] among the political orders of the earthly city America is “the last, best, hope of man-
kind”. Although it was added late to the Pledge of Allegiance, the affirmation that we are a nation 
“under God” is not unimportant. It does not mean that [Americans] are God’s chosen nation and 
[they] should be uneasy even with Lincoln’s sharply modified claim that [they] are an “almost cho-
sen” people. Nor does it mean that [they] are immune to the temptations and tragedies of all earthly 
orders. To say that [they] are a nation under God is to say, first and most importantly, that [they] are 
a nation under transcendent judgment. Judgment and promise are inseparable.88 
85 See: M. J. Perry, Toward a Theory of Human Rights: Religion, Law, Courts, Cambridge 2007.
86 R. J. Neuhaus, American Babylon…, p. 211–212.
87 Ibidem, p. 27–30.
88 Ibidem, p. 24–25.
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No doubt, the modern world can be described as a slow dissolution of the 
covenantal story of humanity from which the Western idea of freedom originated. 
This idea of freedom stemmed from a destruction of united sovereignty. But moder-
nity embarked on its slow reassertion again. This reassertion of the unified sovere-
ignty thus goes hand in hand with the dissolution of Judeo-Christian anthropology 
and the Christian theory of power. It is based on the axiom of the impossibility of 
a unified political, earthly sovereignty, by the very fact of the absolute sovereignty 
of God being in personal covenantal relationship with all human beings. Humans 
are under the individual protection of God, with human arrangements always con-
ditional, to be recognized as legitimate, only if they do not subvert that prior rela-
tionship which was a source of personal freedom and its duty to shape consciences 
according to God’s promise, so the fullness of human potential can be achieved89.
Modernity has progressively tried to destroy that dualism, by a subversion 
of the political theory on which it rested, but first of all by a destruction of a me-
taphysical story, the transcendental “story” without which such a dualism was im-
possible. It attached a metaphysical dimension to this world in the form of the idea 
of progress, with a destruction of transcendental religion as a competitor to the 
pretenses of the modern state. In that process a corresponding reduction of the me-
taphysics of God to the metaphysics of historical progress occurred, coupled with 
the psychotherapeutic progress of self-realization.90 
There is, of course, a danger of idolatry. G.K. Chesterton remarked in the 
1920s that “America is a nation with the soul of a church”, showing a certain ide-
ologisation of the American message, but that in itself was not yet a danger. The 
real danger, pointed out Neuhaus, is that “in the absence of an ecclesiology that 
tethered them to the Church from its beginnings through every period of its history, 
for many American Protestant thinkers America became their Church.”
Neuhaus adamantly opposed the idolatry of treating America as a fulfillment 
of the New Jerusalem. Mainline Protestant Churches have been prone to Gnosti-
cism since their transformation of particularities and bringing “religious knowled-
ge “to the world has been connected first with Americanization of such a religious 
knowledge of social gospel, then with its universalization through American po-
wer.”91 Whatever form such idolatry took, it is profoundly against the real under-
standing of America as a universal, covenantal and religious nation.92 
There was yet another attempt at solidity and the doctrine of this “new 
Church” of civil religion, with the rise of the Social Gospel movement and Ameri-
canized Christianity at the turn of the 20th century. Then America became “not only 
a nation with the soul of a church, but [became] the Church”, its self-understanding 
89 Ibidem, p. 34.
90 Ibidem, p. 35.
91 R. Gamble, The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of the 
Messianic Nation, Wilmington DE 2003.
92 R. J. Neuhaus, American Babylon…, p. 39.
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soon shattered by the fundamentalist-modernist split within Protestant Christianity. 
There was then a substitution for this spiritual longing of self-redemption as psy-
chology and psychotherapy movement or John Dewey’s educational and monistic 
American education, kind of a 
[...] distinctly American religion that would leave behind the doctrinal and ecclesiological 
disputes of the hoary past and embrace the people of good will in the grand cause of progressive 
social reform.93
This idea stuck with the American progressive intelligentsia and found the 
“new church” in democracy as such.94 To a certain extent the rebellion of the ‘60s 
was a kind of search for a true “church” of America as contrasted with the cor-
rupted “‘Amerika’ [sic!], against which it protested”. Whatever the goal of such 
a mesmerizing search, all such efforts were conflating covenantal mentality with the 
totality of American experience, transformed from now on for good. Yet such efforts 
constituted a kind of idolatrous escape from the burden of the „religious covenant”, 
understood within the structured, Augustinian framework. All of them could be lo-
oked upon as “the perennial effort … to make sense of the story of America within 
the story of the world”.95
We must therefore return, argues Neuhaus, to a thorough rethinking of the 
proper relationship of America’s story with that of the world, in whose “compre-
hensible account” it is caught up. There is no other way, since from the very be-
ginning, from John Winthrop, through the Puritans, to today this connection has 
been solid and inescapable. A good starting point for Neuhaus is Murray, who is 
“an unavoidable point of reference in discussions about America and providential 
purpose”. Neuhaus realizes that Murray was devoid of any idolatry towards Ame-
rica and, unlike Dewey or Rorthy and many others, who were yearning for secular 
“metaphysics”, America was not his religion, because he never confused America 
with the Church.96 The American founders agreed with the long-standing Christian 
stance that God had planted in the heart of man the precepts of natural law, sealed 
for them in the Decalogue. Neuhaus’s vision was congruent with this vision for 
universal reasons, justified by the ultimate human value of freedom in pursuit of 
one’s betterment. This public discourse should be guided by an appeal to natural 
law, the central idea of the American founding written into the Declaration of Inde-
pendence in 1776, and at the same time accompanied by the presence of a Church 
that effectively 
93 Ibidem, p. 43.
94 The latest progressive hero of that movement was the late Richard Rorthy, who abandoned his post-
modernist “church” and recognized American democracy as a real, valuable thing. R. Rorthy, Achieving Our 
Country, Cambridge Mass. 1992, p. 87.
95 R. J. Neuhaus, American Babylon…, p. 45.
96 Ibidem, p. 50.
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[...] challenged democracy’s idolatrous aspirations to finality – could provide a public phi-
losophy for sustaining the American experiment in producing as just and free a society as is possible 
in this our exile from our true homeland.97
There have been many who have proposed a remedy to the recovery of this 
universal message of the American experiment, which means a recovery of natural 
law, so central to the Declaration of Independence. Traditionally, Churches in Ame-
rica, mainly the mainline Protestant Churches, have performed that task of being 
a primary bearer of the American story as a universal story for humanity. Apart 
from that, the tradition of natural law was not part of their theology. But this is 
no longer the case, as Neuhaus pointed out. The mainline Protestant Churches are 
today viewed as “oldline” or “sideline”, and unfortunately they have totally mixed 
politics with the religious message, and in that very partisan politics, planting “the 
banner ‘Thus Saith the Lord’ on the cultural and political platform of the Left”. In 
turn the evangelical Protestant insurgency, having greater political visibility and 
vitality, have planted “the same banner on the cultural and political platform of the 
right”.98 This is a tragedy, according to Neuhaus, since both undermine 
[...] a religiously informed public philosophy for the American experiment, contributing at the 
same time to the political corruption of Christian faith and the religious corruption of authentic poli-
tics; both have forgotten that, as it is said in the Letter to the Hebrews, we have here no abiding city.99
But the Catholic hierarchy is also split, partly still trying to ingratiate itself 
into the old mainline Protestant establishment, remembering the historical difficul-
ties of being accepted into American life on equal terms, and partly sharing its belli-
gerency with the evangelicals on moral and cultural questions. But, warns Neuhaus, 
Catholics should remember that the Church is to be the “contrast society”, not to be 
above the quarrel, but neither the captive to it. As Neuhaus stresses over and over 
again, the Church’s chief political contribution is to provide a transcendent horizon 
for American civil arguments, the role it should be fulfilling all over the world at 
the same time. America has a great “proposition”, which provides Americans with 
a great chance to conduct such a discussion in terms that are universal and particu-
lar at the same time. But there is no way that cultural limitations of one’s position 
can be avoided, or for that matter, shunned. Culture is the only medium available 
for us, claims Neuhaus, and a particular national community should not be treated 
as a calamity, but as a chance to improve on it, in the light of truths higher than the 
immediate chances of realizing that.
There is thus no chance and no need to shun American identity, especially if 
that identity embodies such truths in a direct way. There is a great role of America, 
which can help make such truths understood by all. This should be done not by im-
97 Ibidem, p. 52–53.
98 Ibidem, p. 54.
99 Ibidem.
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position, but, as John Winthorp and Abraham Lincoln envisioned them, by making 
oneself a better community. So, concludes Neuhaus, 
[...] when I meet God, I expect to meet him as an American. Not most importantly as an 
American but as someone who tried to take seriously, and tried to encourage others to take serio-
usly, the story of America within the story of the world. The argument, in short, is that God is not 
indifferent towards American experiment, and therefore we who are called to think about God and 
his ways through time dare not be indifferent to the American experiment. America is not uniquely 
Babylon, but it is our time and place in Babylon. We seek its peace, in which, as Jeremiah said, we 
find our peace, as we yearn for and anticipate by faith and sacramental grace the New Jerusalem 
that is out pilgrim goal. It is time to think again-to think deeply and think religiously-about the sto-
ry of America within the story of the world. Again the words of Augustine:’ It is beyond anything 
incredible that God should have willed the kingdom of men, their dominations and their servitudes, 
to be outside the range of the laws of his providence.100
Neuhaus was hope personified, Christian optimism applied to all the most 
forlorn causes. It was for this reason that he never refused to engage in a civilized 
conversation with anyone, even the cognoscenti in the West who had already stop-
ped responding to the Christian narrative. But Neuhaus was constantly challenging 
that predicament, and wanted to engage reality and others in a conversation about 
Being. For him, as a Christian and a Catholic it was obvious that the Covenant and 
the Promise have never been revoked, and humans are all Pilgrims yearning for 
return to innocence, which once was, and they hope might be again. Humans may 
commit errors, even very grave ones. But he refused to accept that fate, since he 
always repeated, after Ralph Inge and T.S. Eliot, that quintessentially bittersweet 
blessing of Christian hope, that in this world, “there are no permanently lost causes, 
because there are no gained causes”.101 
It is not victory which counts, but the verity of the cause which has to be 
recalled all over again. Christians have a good word for that: “witnessing”. And 
Neuhaus was one of the greatest Christian witnesses, and apologists, in a contem-
porary, increasingly ideological and monistic liberal Agora.102 We have a will to 
decide what to take and what to abandon. This is not Nietzsche’s choice based on 
the will for power and grandeur. This is not existentialism’s choice which claims 
that we are simply creatures of time. Christian time is different, because it rejects 
a senseless concept of time, such a concept of time which 
[...] explain[s] our existence exhaustively and without remainder. Time too is a creature. 
There is ‘reality’ beyond time because being creatures of time, we are unable to think except in 
a temporal model. It is an irrational presumption, however, to presume that reality is limited to what 
we conceive.103 
100 Ibidem, p. 55.
101 W. R. Inge, More Lay Thoughts of a Dean, New York 1931, p. 201; T. S. Eliot, For Lancelot Andrewes: 
Essays on Style and Order, Garden City 1929, p. 78.
102 R. J. Neuhaus, American Babylon..., p. 213–214.
103 Ibidem, p. 223.
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Neuhaus considers such a rationality to be an instance of a truncated reason, 
which is against Christian reason which he thinks is incomparably wider, not subject 
to self-contradictions, circular self- justifications or self-explanations. Existentially 
such reason is dangerous since it can produce either despair or presumption, the two 
most diametrically opposed forms of hopelessness. At the nadir of despair, argues 
Neuhaus, quoting Joseph Pieper, if we reject eschatological fulfillment, which is in 
itself the self-destructive and perverse, then we behave in a way which “borders on 
the most extreme form of the not less destructive delusion of presumption, meaning 
a logical affirmation of non-fulfillment, as though it were fulfillment”.104
Neuhaus shows that Christianity broke the senselessness of experience of 
time. Judaism’s doing that was based on promise, but Christianity’s God incarnated 
himself in the finitude of space and time, effectively ending hope without palpa-
ble proof that it would be fulfilled. That is why the Christian pilgrim’s destination 
is “not so much a place as a person”. This Christian hope is not otherworldly, in 
the sense of a promise that people will go to heaven when they die. This is not so 
much untrue as it is incomplete and woefully inadequate, since “redemption or 
salvation is … not an escape from this world but as participation in the future that 
is already happening in…”105 The modern displacement of the gospel of Christ 
with the gospel of historical process gave way to a new faith in progress. It was 
a great substitution in which faith has become something like a new religion, with 
the enlightenment envisioning infinite progress. This enlightenment was to free 
a man at the same time from tyranny of the Church, metaphysics and the oppressive 
political systems. Hope without which people could not live, found expression in 
the idea of progress, which depended upon freedom, innovation, imagination and 
self-realization in history.106 
But this causes freedom being tied to change, as Neuhaus observes, and in 
the absence of the stable human nature, change presses for the infinite malleability 
of human nature in the name of progress. The modern idea of “emancipation” from 
“oppression” to freedom of the imperial Self, total moral freedom, is a consequence 
of such a logic. No structure can guarantee a good state of the world, since people, 
individual people at least, cannot reconcile themselves to any definite structure like 
that. It is not only that man’s freedom would be denied. This is above all because 
there is never a point in which a human being along the way of progress would 
consider his or her imperial Self finally liberated and reconciled with reality. Psy-
chotherapy is one answer to that, but it obviously failed.107
The substitution of historical progress for a Christian vision of eschatolo-
gical progress turned out to be an escape from Reality as such, which Christianity 
defined by locating anthropological reasoning in a proper metaphysical perspec-
104 Ibidem, p. 223–224.
105 Ibidem, p. 232.
106 Ibidem, p. 235.
107 Ibidem, p. 236.
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tive. Such an escape from Reality has not brought freedom, observes Neuhaus, 
but periodic enslavements and ultimately despair. Neuhaus’s appeal to recognize 
the Christian eschatological perspective is a call for return to Reality, and thus to 
a properly understood reason, which could then engage itself so as to decipher the 
bordering condition of human nature, that is freedom itself. It is thus a plea not for 
a generic religion, which too often today is tantamount to nebulous, psychothe-
rapeutic spirituality, bur for the Christian idea of freedom, its only sure basis and 
human dignity in that. 
The practical consequences of such an approach were manifold, but one was 
obvious, as Neuhaus had apparently no doubt in stressing. Liberal democracy, if 
it wanted to sustain its idea of practical freedom, had to recognize the political si-
gnificance of the Christian theological language of freedom as a corrective of that 
freedom which was tied to the idea of progress. The latter leads inexorably either to 
totalitarian control in the hands of the “masters” of direction of that progress or to 
a debilitating anarchy and chaos of the imperial Self, declared to be a new god 
of the post-modern, solipsistic and eventually narcissistic human being. If so, the 
“naked public square” is inimical to the self-declared aims which the liberal state 
wants to achieve. It does not sustain freedom but subverts it, and as a consequence 
destroys human dignity. And it subverts human dignity because it subverts reality 
as it is. Both Christian eschatology and the idea of progress were a response to the 
loss of human innocence. This loss of innocence has, Neuhaus always claims, pu-
shed humanity into all kinds of more or less desperate attempts, sometimes stupid, 
sometimes criminal, or just ridiculous, to “close the gap” and to liquidate aliena-
tion, so to “close time”. 
The most scandalous reality of that alienation was of course the fact of 
human mortality.108 The secular pilgrims’ destination is just history, propelled by 
progress in a frantic activity to extend existence, and more and more infusing 
a secular myth with all kinds of spiritual sprinklings which do not solve the fear, 
just sublimate it into a kind of melancholic pantheism, which gives no answer, just 
an anesthetic. Neuhaus shares an essentially Augustinian view of the limits and 
chances of history, of a dialectic of time and eternity, of a fight between the city of 
man and the City of God which will never end here on earth. This is a perspective 
which is decisive in his vision of what Christianity and the Church has to propose 
to the world. Atheism might be a form of a cry for justice. Neuhaus does not deny 
that, noticing only that the new atheists usually act as “secularists” or “secular 
humanists”. Although Christians rightly lay claim to the title of humanism, secular 
humanists, as the phrase is used today, are typically those who 
[...] acknowledge no reality that transcends the saeculum, meaning the temporal order. … All 
that was and is to be is confined within the limits of history. But such humanists … can [not] live wi-
thout hope … Some kind of eschatology, … a sense of destination in which history culminates in the 
108 Ibidem, p. 238–239, 230.
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true community…, is inherent in the thought and action of all serious people. Thoughtful secularists 
know that this longing ….has again and again ended up in utopian irrelevance, chaos or tyranny. They 
want no more of that. What then are they to do with that hope that will not go away and cannot be 
discarded without risking the loss of their humanity, and how are they rationally to explain it? Many 
invest their hope in historical progress. … many in “the satisfied conscience” …. [after] Kant. [But] 
it is something of a stretch, however, for the person of “satisfied conscience” to believe that his life 
answers the question of cosmic meaning. Such a view may reflect a modest opinion of history but 
an implausibly inflated opinion of the self. It implies the impossible disengagement of the self from 
history, by which the self is constituted, and however well intended, is not easily distinguished from 
egotism unbounded.109
But there is no vindication of the self, claims Neuhaus, in isolation from the 
world of which humans are part. It is exactly the redemption of the world, which 
is totally contrary to disengagement from it, in which Christians seek their own 
redemption.110 In that perspective, asserts Neuhaus, Christians, and other people 
of transcendental faith, engage the atheists of this world, their fellow exiles in the 
city of man, even those, like post-modernists, who would distance themselves from 
the world by substituting irony for hope’s longings and mundane grief. Christians 
have always been with dual citizenship. They know that this it is impossible to save 
this world by itself, and cannot provide a perspective harnessing the calamities of 
a progressive mind. Neuhaus’s book suddenly becomes the end a great American je-
remiad, as if recalling the religious and political sermons of John Winthorp, Orestes 
Brownson, Abraham Lincoln, Martin Luther King. The Jeremiad has been a Chri-
stian and all too American genre, a warning against losing hope and a call for action 
without which there is only quietist resignation in a meaningless world, a betrayal of 
that great promise which God gave Americans in their providential scheme. Ameri-
can biblical culture has as its central element oratory, an indispensable feature of the 
public life of the United States. 
The American promise imposes on it a heroic challenge to live up to it. They 
sealed that promise in their founding document, the Declaration of Independence, 
as a political as well as religious document, infused with transcendental as well as 
mundane references. So in the great tradition of the Jeremiad Neuhaus plunges into 
a fiery, oratory envisioning a time of a great, as usual, contest between hope and 
despair, between heroism and acedia, when Christians and Americans seek to be 
[...] faithful in a time not of our choosing but of our testing. We resist the hubris of presuming 
that it is the definite time and place of historical promise or tragedy, but it is our time and place. It is 
a time of many times: a time for dancing, even to the songs of Zion in a foreign land; a time for wal-
king together, unintimidated when we seem to be a small and beleaguered band; a time for rejoicing 
in momentary triumphs, and for defiance in momentary defeats; a time for persistence in reasoned 
argument, never tiring in proposing to the world a more excellent way; a time for generosity towards 
those who would make us their enemy; and finally, a time for happy surrender to brother death – but 
not before, through our laughter and tears, we see and hail from afar the New Jerusalem and know 
that it is all time toward home.111 
109 Ibidem, p. 245–246.
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Neuhaus, with his American Babylon saying farewell to his earthly existen-
ce, accepted the idea that Christendom might be, for a moment, gone. But the battle 
which Christianity has been is a universal battle for the type of civilization in which 
we all would like to live. It was inconceivable for him that such a civilization might 
let go without a fight of people of good will against the sinister winds of the new 
one. This new civilization professed to be a charitable, human rights civilization, 
but suddenly began to decide who was to live and who was to die, and recognized 
a human person as the ultimate judge of good and evil rooted in the imperial Self 
as a basis of right. It was inexorably pushing morality into the abyss of egotistical 
desire. Neuhaus believed that this final act of rebellion of a Creature against the 
Creator was just a temporary tribulation which has to be endured. 
Neuhaus’s life was a lifelong love affair with Christianity, the universe of 
his choice and love from which he explored everything else. Christianity was for 
him a home, a duty, a call to action, a final rest. He did not believe in just any god, 
let alone the god of the new atheists. He believed in God, who made a covenant 
individually with every human being, so each could be not only historically, but 
metaphysically safe, so we could finally rest and the dragons of our cosmic fear 
and insignificance be broken. Neuhaus’s life was an incessant fight for life aga-
inst the forces of death. Everything he did in his life was propelled by a desire to 
preserve this spark of God’s mad love for human beings so they could transcend 
their beastly state of nature and be better than they themselves are. His fight with 
the “naked public square” was not a trite affair. It was ultimately a war for caritas 
against the modern sophisticates in love with themselves, thinking that this limited 
point in time and space give them the authority to usurp for themselves the defini-
tion of human reality. The barbarians who embarked on the totalitarian project of 
“emancipation”, which is in fact an emancipation to an unbound anarchic freedom 
of the imperial Self, the ultimate liberation to Nothingness, another great project 
of human engineering to create a new civilization, ending history for good. This 
was for Neuhaus a project out of the story of the great rebellion in Paradise, which 
would end up at the cemetery of heuristic ideas as well.
As for Mater Ecclesia, his most intimate home, knowing well that this is the 
sacred institution of the fallen people, he had no patience with reformers who had 
not recognized the great continuity amid evolution, which always comes back to 
the Source. If asked what kind of Church he was for, the Church of yesterday or 
the Church of tomorrow, he could respond as his friend, the great Avery Cardinal 
Dulles, once calmly responded to such a question: “The Church of yesterday, the 
Church of today, the Church of tomorrow, the Church eternal”. 
Neuhaus knew that Christianity could be defeated, but human longing for 
eternal love can never be defeated or sublimated. As a public philosopher he was in 
a classical sense a lover of truth. Neuhaus knew the fallacy of thinking that we are 
the last, and that because of that, we can see through Being as better or much wiser 
than those who were our predecessors. Thus for him history, let alone politics, was 
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not all there was to life, and could never quench our thirst for fulfillment. The ulti-
mate meaning was somewhere else because, although existentially 
[...] the time of tribulation is upon us, and we now must make our way through its darkness, 
guided only by the waning lights of memory and the flickering flame of hope, not knowing when 
the night will end, [we are] sustained by the sacred assurance that whoever perseveres to the end 
shall be saved.112
He was an outstanding public teacher in the best tradition of Christian apolo-
getics. He was an outstanding teacher because, to paraphrase the Catholic political 
philosopher James V. Schall, he led all not to himself, but to the truth, to something 
not just passing and ephemeral, but to that which just eternally is.
112 D. B. Hart, A Perfect Game, “First Things”, August–September 2010, p. 55.
